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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES
Matt Cook
Guillermo Ordoñez
This dissertation consists of three independent articles on the subjects of entrepreneurial
ventures and occupational choice. The first article examines the flow of information between entrepreneurs and investors in a theoretical venture capital market, analyzing how
informational asymmetries and evaluative bias affect equilibrium fundraising, investment,
and implementation strategies. The second article investigates the gender income differential using a model of occupational choice, maternity choice, and the ability to stochastically
wage climb. The third article theoretically examines the location choice and endogenous
growth dynamics of television productions facing labor supplies that are heterogeneous in
skill level. Location choice is influenced by tax considerations, as well as the regional accessibility of talent; the model is used to explain why studios and producers have begun shifting
television production outside of Hollywood despite the high concentration of production
talent in Los Angeles.
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CHAPTER 1 : Venture Capital Search with Signalling and Asymmetric Uncertainty
Abstract. This paper examines the flow of information between entrepreneurs and investors in a theoretical venture capital market: How do informational asymmetries and
evaluative bias affect equilibrium fundraising, investment, and implementation strategies? We present a search model of the VC market in which entrepreneurs seek to
undertake risky projects and venture capitalists seek to fund projects. Both sides of the
market have private information in each period of a three-stage game. The persistence
of private information gives rise to a dynamic system with nonlinear feedback, resulting in a rich system of integral equations. Our analysis demonstrates how bias and
informational asymmetries lead to inefficient capital allocation (and acceptance) strategies, while repeated interactions between entrepreneurs and VCs mitigate informational
differences over time.

1.1. Introduction
Markets characterized by asymmetric information between participants often rely upon
signalling before transaction. The flow of accurate information may be constrained by accessibility, communicability, and moral hazard. Informational differences are particularly
complex in markets for financial capital. Venture capitalists and private equity firms see
hundreds to thousands of business plans each year: They observe trends, conduct market
research, hear pitches, meet with founders, and employ industry specialists with expertise
and access to broad information networks—all means of collecting information by which
to evaluate ventures. Entrepreneurs have intimate knowledge of their own character, commitment, and productivity, and may also have deeper understanding of the product or
technology pending development.
Using their available resources, both the entrepreneur and the lender form impressions of a
project’s quality. These signals approximate the underlying true potential, with precision
determined by experience, evaluative ability, and informational access.
The relationship between entrepreneur and venture capitalist conforms to the framework
of global games introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), wherein players receive
noisy signals of the true state of the world. Global games have been applied to the study
of financial markets frequently, particularly to crises including speculative attacks, bank
runs, and bubbles, as in work done by Morris and Shin (1998), Morris and Shin (2001),
Angeletos and Werning (2006), and Hellwig et al. (2006).
Observable actions of the entrepreneur and investor can convey information to be reflected
Coauthor : Ross Askanazi
Key words and phrases. Signalling, capital search markets, entrepreneurship, information asymmetry, global
games, optimism, small business financing
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in respective updated valuations of a project. Leland and Pyle (1977) show that an entrepreneur’s inclination to invest in his own project, measured by shares retained, can act
as a positive signal of quality to the lender.
The ability of entrepreneurs to signal the value of their firms to potential investors has
been studied empirically. Keasey et al. (1992) examine firms seeking a listing on the U.K.
Unlisted Securities Market (USM). The authors consider a number of signals, including the
percentage of equity retained by entrepreneurs, and find firm value to be positively related
to shares retained by the entrepreneur. Audretsch et al.

(2009) consider patenting and

prototyping activities as signals; data from over 900 nascent entrepreneurs suggest patenting
and prototyping in early stages increase the likelihood of external financing. A study by
Nofsinger and Wang (2011) examines the methods by which institutional vs. informal
investors receive signals, finding institutional investors rely more on their own abilities and
quality of investor protection, while informal investors tend to use product type, level of an
entrepreneur’s experience, and personal relationships to reduce information asymmetry.
This paper presents a search model wherein an entrepreneur carries ideas of stochastic
quality to fruition in three phases: idea search (brainstorm), funding search, and implementation. The entrepreneur and investors receive noisy signals as to an idea’s true quality,
with varied relative precisions. Investor optimality is determined through a zero profit condition. The model is used as a tool to study the flow of information between investors
and entrepreneurs; it helps quantify the impact of informational asymmetry and transfer
on search behavior and equity contract formation, as well as the losses associated with
the inability to transfer information accurately or from one side being systematically misguided. In one application, evaluative bias by entrepreneurs (overconfidence) is modeled
as a (positive) linear shift in the distribution of signals received by entrepreneurs, so that
their posterior beliefs are no longer centered at an idea’s true quality. The framework presented serves as a basis for analysis of the welfare cost of overconfidence, which can induce
suboptimal investment, fundraising, and implementation behavior by entrepreneurs. The
model can be used to study the effects of optimism on expected search time, and to explain
the existence of financial experts who receive more precise signals. It can also be used to
compare the cost of overconfidence in different investment environments, i.e., at venture
capital firms where investors’ signals are relatively precise, versus government institutions
where investors’ signals are imprecise. The model can also be used to measure the value of
learning by doing, in the spirit of Fraser and Green (2006), who find that overconfidence
bias tends to diminish with experience.
This paper further validates that result, finding that an entrepreneur’s willingness to shop
a project can serve as a positive signal to venture capitalists, whose equity requirement in
2

turn signals the entrepreneur before he accepts or rejects a contract.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, our model speaks to the relative significance of adverse versus advantageous selection in search and matching process. Beginning
with the seminal Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), adverse selection has
been shown to induce nonexistence of equilibria in many models. Efforts to overcome this
problem have ranged from restricting models via capacity constraints and size of the economy, as in Inderst and Wambach (2001), to contract rationing, as in Prescott and Townsend
(1984), Gale (1992), and Dubey (2002). This literature abstracts away from multiplicity of
equilibria by restricting the size of the economy and the potential behaviors of their agents.
Significant discussion has been devoted to how the properties of the learning mechanisms of
the agents interacts with these restrictions. However, the bulk of this literature agrees that
equilibria in models with adverse selection are Pareto inefficient, and this gives rise to a new
body of literature discussing regulatory mechanisms for resolving this Pareto inefficiency.
Voucher markets in health insurance markets have been discussed by Cutler and Reber
(1998). Cohen and Dehejia (2004) examined the role that mandatory insurance plays in
the prevalence of traffic fatalities. Chiappori and Salanie (2000) study the French motor
insurance market and the role of regulation. Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) more
recently study a search theoretic setting, showing that adverse selection plays a significant
role in frictional search markets.
The advantageous selection literature poses a paradigm in which these problems are not as
severe as the prevailing literature suggests. Beginning with the seminal De Meza and Webb
(2001), economists have asked what implications may hold when selection is based on risk
aversion in addition to ex ante quality. In particular, selection is advantageous when the
more risk averse participate more fully in a market (say, by buying more insurance), and in
addition the more risk averse are actually less risky. The reason is that conditioning on risk
aversion then induces positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk that an agent
presents. This result is shown to have empirical significance in the health insurance market
by Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2006). Davidoff and Welke (2007) find a similar result
for reverse mortgages. In all cases the result is driven by the fact that agents heterogenous
in their types are also heterogenous in their preferences, and that types and preferences are
linked. In the above example, this manifests as risk-averse individuals also engaging in less
risky behavior. Our paper will claim that the result holds for funding search markets as
well, since agents of lower quality prefer not to reach an implementation stage. The model
is stylized in such a way that “implementation” may be interpreted broadly, from starting
a business to a generic firm-worker matchup. This allows us to conjecture that the result
will carry through to general labor market search settings. We thus consider our paper part
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of an ongoing modern conversation on the theory of adverse versus advantageous selection.
The second contribution is to the role that overconfidence plays in entrepreneurial markets.
The prevalence of overconfidence has been well established. One of the first related studies,
by Cooper et al. (1988), examines data from 2,994 members of the National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB) and finds significant optimism in entrepreneurs’ perception of
their odds for success. Furthermore, entrepreneurs tend to rank their own odds for success
higher than other business owners with similar ideas; evaluations also tend to have little
relationship with objective predictors. Work by Cassar and Friedman (2007) links individual overconfidence with more aggressive entrepreneurial startup decisions, finding a positive
association between overconfidence and propensity for startup activity. Using a variety of
overconfidence measures, Dai and Ivanov (2010) find no evidence to suggest banks curtail
lending to overconfident entrepreneurs; rather, banks are more likely to lend to the optimistic, and without charging an interest premium or requiring more collateral. One might a
priori suspect that interactions between agents and markets could fix overconfidence, since
prices are quite revealing as economic objects, and would therefore be surprised by the
prevailing literature that this is not the case. One might also suspect that since information
in an economy is widely dispersed, and overcoming overconfidence requires effectively aggregating private information, that markets may be inefficient at performing this task. Our
model shows that both cases are possible, and which prevails is indeed highly contingent
on the precise information structure of the economy.
Our third contribution is to the applied computational literature on dynamic systems with
feedback. Systems of integral equations in the mathematics literature are described as
Volterra integral equations. The computational economics literature has been aware that
agents interacting and learning from the behavior of other agents induces a system of
Volterra integral equations. Our paper presents a stylized model with nontrivial dynamics
that through the use of the integral equation literature remains numerically tractable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the capital search model, characterizes optimal strategies for the investor and entrepreneur, and describes an effective
reparametrization of the value functions. Section 1.3 examines three baseline cases, when
both or either the entrepreneur and/or investor observes true quality directly. Section 1.4
introduces and discusses the qualitative effects of an overconfidence parameter. Section 1.5
analyzes results of the numerical solution. A timeline of the model and the feedback cycle,
a programming method for a numerical solution, plots, relevant derivations, and a notation
guide can be found in the Appendices.

4

1.2. The Model
An entrepreneur living in infinite discrete time may start a business by moving through three
phases: brainstorming, funding, and implementation. During the brainstorming phase,
2 )
exactly one idea arrives each period, at a cost cB , with stochastic quality q ∗ ∼ N (µ, σN
2 ).
drawn by nature and which the entrepreneur views with a noisy signal q E ∼ N (q ∗ , σE

Aware of the prior on q ∗ and the likelihood of his own signal, the entrepreneur deduces
a posterior p(q ∗ |q E ) using Bayes’ rule. Using this posterior, he decides whether to spend
another period brainstorming or to begin the funding search. If he continues brainstorming,
his current q ∗ is discarded, and he receives a new idea according to the same process.
During a period of fundraising, the entrepreneur pays a cost cF and taps into a pool of
risk-neutral, homogeneous, competitively-behaving venture capitalist investors. This pool
of investors collectively receives its own signal as to the project’s true quality. Investors
within the pool, all seeing the same private investor signal, then each bid for the opportunity
to enter a funding contract with the entrepreneur. A bid is a proposed share offer s, meaning
the share of future revenue R the investor wishes to keep. Since all investors receive the same
signal, they are participating in a common value auction with identical information. The
auction is comparable to Bertrand competition in which profit is driven out. We henceforth
regard the “pool” of investors as a single, representative investor bound by a zero-profit
condition.
After receiving an offer from this representative investor, the entrepreneur has three options:
accept the equity contract and move to the implementation phase, reject the offer and
continue the funding search, or reject the offer and drop the idea altogether for further
brainstorming. Both the entrepreneur and investors discount at β.
During the implementation phase, an idea yields a risky return R drawn from a truncated
2 and support [ K , ∞]. The lower bound
normal distribution centered at q ∗ with variance σR
β

was selected to ensure nonnegative present discounted profits for any project.



1
R − q∗


φ


σR
σR


!, R ≥ K

β
K
∗
−
q
∗
p(R|q ) = 1 − Φ β


σR





0,
otherwise

(1.2.1)

This lower bound is selected without significant loss of generality, since the goal of the
5

entrepreneur is to select a single project for implementation. Thus fruitful analysis is
still driven by opportunity costs for the entrepreneur. Moreover, this assumption yields
significant tractability by allowing us to abstract away from the notion of default in this
environment. Default penalties and walkaway options in the venture capital industry are
complex legal objects we do not wish to consider.
0

0

The payoff structure is consistent with the idea that q ∗ > q ∗ implies p(R|q ∗ ) first order
stochastic dominates p(R|q ∗ ), capturing the notion that higher quality ideas yield greater
expected profit. The expectation of R conditional on q ∗ is
K
φ
∗

∗

E[R|q ] = q + σR

β

−q ∗
σR

K
1−Φ

β



−q ∗
σR

 = q ∗ + Ψ(K, σR , β, q ∗ )

(1.2.2)

The entrepreneur has CRRA utility

U (c) =

c1−ρ
1−ρ

For the majority of analysis, we consider the risk-neutral case with ρ = 0.
A project requires fixed cost K to implement. This fixed cost may be considered to include
technology, business connections, and other non-pecuniary costs that only investors can
provide, hence the necessity of the fundraising stage. An investor’s signal of true quality is
governed by a different constant variance: q I ∼ N (q ∗ , σI2 ). σI < σE implies investors better
assess revenue potential than entrepreneurs (and vice versa). A private venture capital firm
would most likely be represented by a small σI , while a government agency may have a
larger σI due to less investment experience and a lack of profit incentive.
Investors exhibit no memory or evaluative spillover for ideas. That is, if an entrepreneur
rejects an offer and continues the funding search next period with the same idea, investors
treat the idea as new: They draw a new q I and do not condition their posterior for q ∗ on
previous assessments by themselves or other VC firms. Equivalently, during each period
of fundraising, the entrepreneur is pitching the idea to a new risk-neutral, competitivelybehaving pool of investors that has not seen the idea or communicated with other pools,
and which draws its own noisy signal governed by the constant investor variance.
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We make the following simplifying assumption of investor naivety: Each investor always
believes himself to be the first who has been pitched the idea; that is, he always believes n
equals 1, where n is the number of times a specific idea has been pitched. Each investor is
aware that other investors are similarly naive, but does not question the validity of his own
naive assumption. Entrepreneurs are aware of investor naivety. This simplification, which
does not qualitatively affect our result, is made for tractability and will be defended in the
next section.
For a given project, the entrepreneur retains all information of his previous offers, and with
each new offer updates his posterior on q ∗ . Let ~s be the vector of all offers the entrepreneur
has received during his funding search. The entrepreneur’s posterior is then p(q ∗ |q E , ~s).
Once an investment offer has been declined, it may not be revisited. Denote by simp the
offer finally implemented by the entrepreneur. This will be the last element of ~s.
The value functions V, W, and X of the brainstorming, funding, and implementation phases
are given respectively by:

E

V (q E ) = −cB + β max{Eq V (q E ), Es W (q E , s)}
0

E

W (q E , ~s) = −cF + β max{Eq V (q E ), Es W (q E , (~s, s0 )), X(q E , ~s)}
∗

X(q E , ~s) = Eq U ((1 − simp )(R|q E , ~s))

(1.2.3)
(1.2.4)
(1.2.5)

In the brainstorm phase, there will be a reservation signal of quality q1R such that the
entrepreneur will proceed to fundraising with any signal q E that is greater than q1R , return
to brainstorming with any signal less than q1R , and be indifferent when the values are equal.
The timeline of the entrepreneur’s venture capital search process and feedback cycle is
illustrated in extensive form in Appendix 1.A.
1.2.1. Investor Behavior
Upon receiving a signal q I , the investor must select a share offer s to make to the entrepreneur. An individual investor thus selects a function s(q I ). Since entrepreneurs face
a pool of investors, there also exists a market share offer function sM (q I ). We consider
the construction where sM is invertible. Entrepreneurs, observing a share offer s, invert
the function sM in order to learn q I . Investors are aware of the function sM and of how
entrepreneurs respond to share offers s.
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An investor considering a project formulates his posterior belief p(q ∗ |q I , q E ≥ q1R ). Since
the investor’s side of this economy is determined competitively, the equilibrium strategy for
investors is determined by a zero profit condition. However, the investor’s posterior upon
receiving a signal is not enough to determine zero profit in expectation; the investor is in fact
concerned with the posterior probability distribution on q ∗ conditional on implementation
being reached. Recalling the simplifying assumption of investor naivety—that the investor
believes his share offer to be the first one received by the entrepreneur—we turn to equation
1.2.4. Let QE (s) be the set of signals q E that the entrepreneur could be holding such
that given a share offer s (and the corresponding q I fully revealed by that s), he prefers
implementing to fundraising or is at least indifferent:

0

QE (s) = {q E : Es W (q E , (s, s0 )) ≤ X(q E , s)}

It is worth pointing out at this stage that the set QE (s) is not necessarily a half-open
interval of the form [Q(s), ∞). There are nontrivial dynamics relating the relative returns
to fundraising and implementation, so that QE (s) for many values of s may become a
disconnected collection of closed intervals. We will return to this point in due course. The
full zero profit condition for the investor is then:

∗

p(q E ∈ QE (s)|q I , q E ≥ q1R )Eq (βsR − K|q I , q E ≥ q1R , q E ∈ QE (s))+
(1 − p(q E ∈ QE (s)|q I , q E ≥ q1R )) × 0 = 0 (1.2.6)

After simplification:
Z

∞

∞

Z

βs
−∞

K
β

Rp(R|q ∗ )p(q ∗ |q I , q E ≥ q1R , q E ∈ QE (s))dRdq ∗ − K = 0

(1.2.7)

Solving this equation for s(q I ) yields:

s(q I ) =

K
β

R∞
−∞

(q ∗

+ Ψ(K, σR

, β, q ∗ ))p(q ∗ |q I , q E

8

≥ q1R , q E ∈ QE (sM (q I )))dq ∗

(1.2.8)

Now we can see how a given market share function sM induces an optimal choice of s(q I )
for an individual investor. The market share function satisfies s(q I ) = sM (q I ) for all q I
in monotonic equilibrium (see Definition 1.2.2). Thus, considering equation 1.2.8 as an
operator mapping sM to s, we see that our task is to find a fixed point of this operator.
Since the posterior mean of q ∗ is increasing in q I , p(q ∗ |q I , q E ≥ q1R ) first order stochastically
0

0

dominates p(q ∗ |q I , q E ≥ q1R ) for q I ≥ q I , yielding downward monotonicity of s(·) in q I
over the range of q I such that there is a positive probability the entrepreneur will accept.
The interpretation is that the more promising the representative investor finds the idea, the
smaller the share he is willing to accept to break even in expectation, and vice versa.
The entrepreneur knows sM (q I ), which is one-to-one. Hence after receiving an offer s the
entrepreneur can take the function’s inverse to deduce q I . The entrepreneur updates his
posterior, now given by p(q ∗ |q E , ~qI )—where q I is the latest in a vector of fully–revealed
investors’ signals—before ultimately making his decision to implement, search for better
funding, or return to the chalkboard for brainstorming.
Without the assumption of investor naivety, QE (s) would become difficult to calculate. An
information structure would have to be assumed: Either the investor would know n exactly,
in which case n would appear as an additional parameter in QE (s) and therefore s(); or he
would not know n, and an expectation would have to be taken over all possible n ≥ 1. In
either case, an arbitrarily large or infinite number of integrals would have to be considered
to account for all possible prior signal paths of length n.
Imposing no more than a zero-profit condition on investor behavior opens the potential for
a multiplicity of equilibria, since at any time the investor has the ability either to (1) make
an offer that, if accepted, earns him zero expected profit ex ante, or to (2) make any offer
he is certain will be rejected by the entrepreneur. Section 1.2.4 presents two definitions
of equilibrium—one in the most generalized form, and another that restricts investors to
share offer functions that are monotonic and hence fully revealing. According to the latter,
more useful monotonic equilibrium notion, s(q I ) is shaped like a logistic function ranging
on (0, 1). For the remainder of the paper we primarily consider this equilibrium notion and
construction of s(q I ).
1.2.2. Parametrizing Value Functions by the Entrepreneur’s Posterior
In the brainstorming phase, the entrepreneur’s only state variable is his own signal. In
the funding phase, the state variables are his own signal and a finite vector of investor
signals, the length of which is given by the number of periods he has pitched the idea
to investors. For convenience, since the latter may grow in size without bound, we can
9

instead describe the state by only three variables: the mean and variance governing the
entrepreneur’s current posterior on q ∗ , and the latest offer s received.
Since the zero-profit strategy employed by investors in equilibrium is injective, a share
offer by the investor fully reveals the investor’s signal q I to the the entrepreneur. Seeing
a sequence of share offers is as informative to the entrepreneur as seeing a sequence of
investors’ signals directly. Since the prior on q ∗ is normal and all signals are drawn from
normal distributions, the posterior for the agent after his own signal of q E and a history of
n signals ~qI is given by

q ∗ |q E , ~qI ∼ N (m, γ 2 (n))

γ 2 (n) =



m = γ 2 (n)

1
n
1
2 + σ2 + σ2
σE
I
N



−1

P I

qE
qt
µ
+
+
2
2
σE
σI2
σN

The entrepreneur’s posterior distribution on q ∗ can always be characterized entirely by the
pair (m, n) after any history of signals. The posterior variance γ 2 (n) does not depend on
the quality of the ~qI signals received; it depends only on the quantity n. The posterior
mean m depends on both the quality and quantity of signals ~qI . During brainstorm, as
soon as q E is drawn, since no offers have been made for the idea at hand, n = 0. Therefore
posterior variance is always constant during the brainstorm, and the value function at that
stage can be parametrized by a single variable: the posterior mean of q ∗ |q E , given by the
above equations at n = 0 and qtI = 0. Call this term mE . Further define s̃(m0 , n, m) as
a function that returns the latest offer that must be received to generate a new posterior
mean of m0 after n + 1 offers, given a previous posterior mean of m on the nth offer.
The value functions can now be reparametrized:

0

E

V (mE ) = −cB + β max{Em V (mE ), Em W (m0 , 1, s̃(m0 , 0, mE ))}
E

(1.2.9)

0

W (m, n, s) = −cF +β max{Em V (mE ), Em W (m0 , n+1, s̃(m0 , n, m)), X(m, n, s)} (1.2.10)
∗

X(m, n, s) = Eq [U ((1 − s)R)|m, n]
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(1.2.11)

To compute expectations in the first two value functions, we require an expression p(m0 |m, n)
to denote the probability that, given a current posterior mean of m after n share offers,
the posterior mean after observing the next share offer will be m0 . This expression and
an expression for s̃(m0 , n, m) are derived in Appendix 1.D. A reparametrization of s(·) in
terms of posterior means is included in this same appendix, as it is useful for the numerical
solution.
For a risk-neutral entrepreneur, the value to implementation given a share offer and a
posterior mean is simply:

∗

X(m, n, s) = ER ((1 − s)R|m, n) = (1 − s)Eq [ER (R|q ∗ )|m, n]

Z
= (1 − s) m +

∞

∗

∗

Ψ(K, σR , β, q )p(q |m, n)dq

∗


(1.2.12)

−∞

The agent’s expected earnings in the implementation phase are increasing in K, since the
distribution of returns is truncated to guarantee nonnegative discounted profits. K represents the overall magnitude of the venture; it could span from an artisan jewelry store to
a pharma company. A larger K should yield large expected revenue for the agent in the
implementation phase: The agent is undertaking a more ambitious endeavor. In this paper
we treat K as fixed.
The value functions and associated expressions may now appear more complex, but by
taking advantage of conjugate priors, the new parametrization constrains dimensionality
that might have otherwise grown without bound. The new method will make a numerical
approach to solving the value functions more manageable.
1.2.3. Entrepreneur Optimality
A strategy for the entrepreneur is a pair (S1 , S2 ) where S1 : R 7→ {brainstorm, f unding} is
a mapping during the brainstorm phase from the entrepreneur’s signal to his current action
space; and S2 : R × Z × (0, 1) 7→ {brainstorm, f unding, implement} is a mapping during
the funding phase from a parametrization of his posterior and his latest offer to his new
action space.
It was previously stated that the optimal S1 can be characterized by a reservation signal
q1R , such that the entrepreneur will attempt funding for any project with signal q E ≥ q1R
11

and continue brainstorming given any signal q E < q1R . Analogously, there is a reservation
R
posterior mean on q ∗ , denoted by mR
1 and corresponding to the reservation signal q1 , such

that he will attempt funding for any project whose posterior mean satisfies mE ≥ mR
1 and
continue brainstorming for any mE < mR
1 . To understand that during brainstorming the
entrepreneur’s optimal strategy will be a reservation strategy, observe the following: The
value of returning to brainstorming is independent of the current posterior mean, while
the value of proceeding to fundraising is increasing in the posterior mean. Therefore, if
it is optimal for the entrepreneur to proceed with some m, it is optimal to proceed for
all m0 > m. We call the reservation strategy during the brainstorming phase the first
reservation strategy, and it solves the indifference equation:
Z

E

E

E

V (m )p(m )dm =

Z

0
R
0
W (m0 , 1, s̃(m0 , 0, mR
1 ))p(m |m1 , n = 0)dm

(1.2.13)

After the entrepreneur has received an equity proposal during fundraising, one might assume his strategy S2 could be characterized by two more reservation posterior means, mR
2 (n)
and mR
3 (n, s), the former representing his indifference between brainstorm and funding, and
the latter representing his indifference between funding and implementation. (Notationally,
these reservation posterior means incorporate the latest fully revealing share offer, s.) Numerical results show us the decision to return to brainstorming can indeed be described by
a reservation strategy, mR
2 (n), and it is not too difficult to verify this analytically since the
ex-ante value to brainstorming is constant. We call this the second reservation strategy,
and it solves the following indifference equation for all n:

Z

E

E

E

V (m )p(m )dm =

Z

0
R
0
W (m0 , n + 1, s̃(m0 , n, mR
2 (n)))p(m |m2 (n), n)dm

(1.2.14)

In what is a key finding of this paper, the same numerical results tell us the rules governing a
decision to implement or further fundraise cannot be expressed as a single reservation mean
for a given (n, s). Instead they would have to be described by a correspondence that maps
(n, s) into a set of posterior means. Alternatively, they could be described by a reservation
share offer, as a function of the current posterior distribution that is given by (m, n). We
call this function sR
3 (m, n), and it is interpreted as “the share offer that, given a posterior
described by (m, n) that has been conditioned on said share offer, makes the entrepreneur
indifferent between implementation and further fundraising.” For a given (m, n), this third
reservation strategy function solves the following indifference equation:
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Z

W (m0 , n + 1, s̃(m0 , n, m))p(m0 |m, n)dm0 = X(m, n, sR
3 (m, n))

(1.2.15)

The system of indifference equations 1.2.13–1.2.15, together with 1.2.9, 1.2.10, and 1.2.11,
fully describes the entrepreneur’s optimal strategies and value functions. The model is
solved numerically using value function iteration described in Appendix 1.B. The third
reservation strategy function is later shown graphically, and economic intuition is provided.
1.2.4. Equilibrium Definitions and Discussion
Now that the optimal behavior of investors and entrepreneurs has been discussed, we define
two types of equilibrium in this economy. The first is an equilibrium notion in its most
generalized form, and the second a slightly more restrictive notion. Once again, let S1 : R 7→
{brainstorm, f unding} map the entrepreneur’s private signal to his action space during the
brainstorming phase, and let S2 : R × Z × (0, 1) 7→ {brainstorm, f unding, implement} map
his parametrized posterior and his latest equity offer to his action space during the funding
phase.
Definition 1.2.1. Generalized equilibrium in this market for ideas and venture capital
consists of a strategy for the entrepreneur given by (S1 , S2 ), a market share offer function
sM (q I ), and a share offer strategy for the investor s : R 7→ (0, 1) such that
(1) the entrepreneur’s strategy solves the reparametrized value functions 1.2.9–1.2.11.
(2) the investor’s share offer strategy yields zero profit to the investor.
(3) s(q I ) = sM (q I ) for all q I such that the investor is not certain sM (q I ) will be rejected.
(4) sM (q I ) is monotonic.
Definition 1.2.2. Monotonic equilibrium in this market for ideas and venture capital consists of a strategy for the entrepreneur given by (S1 , S2 ), a market share offer function
sM (q I ), and a share offer strategy for the investor s : R 7→ (0, 1) such that
(1) the entrepreneur’s strategy solves the reparametrized value functions 1.2.9–1.2.11.
(2) the investor’s share offer strategy yields zero profit to the investor.
(3) s(q I ) = sM (q I ) for all q I ∈ R.
(4) sM (q I ) and s(q I ) are monotonic.
In monotonic equilibrium only, S1 can be characterized by the formerly defined reservation
13

R
R
strategy mR
1 , and S2 by the formerly defined m2 (n) and s3 (m, n).

Observe that in generalized equilibrium, it is possible for the investor to make an offer
he knows will be rejected, and which also misinforms the entrepreneur as to the q I that
was observed. This can never happen in monotonic equilibrium, where share offers are
always correctly and fully revealing. For this reason, we are primarily interested in studying
monotonic equilibrium; for the remainder of the paper it may be assumed we are in this
framework.
Proving the existence of equilibria in this economy is a difficult mathematical task, and
insofar as possible we abstract away from doing so. Heuristically, equilibrium in this economy is the outcome of a large fixed point problem, represented by equation 1.2.8 together
with equations 1.2.9, 1.2.10, and 1.2.11. The key difficulty is showing that there exists a
market share function sM such that equation 1.2.8 is solved by s = sM . Suppose such a
market share function did not exist. Then no matter how the market is behaving, a competing investor pool will not converge to market behavior even as profits disappear. In our
numerical exploration this is never the case; the operator that represents equation 1.2.8
always converges. We leave the mathematical question of when equilibrium might not exist
in this economy to future research. The programming method used to compute a numerical
solution, and the corresponding plots, are found respectively in Appendices 1.B and 1.C.
The entrepreneur wishes to proceed with ideas he believes to be better, since better ideas
are more likely to yield higher rewards. However, waiting before implementation—through
brainstorming, in attempt to draw a good idea, and through fundraising, in attempt to draw
a favorable (and informative) share offer—is costly. A more patient entrepreneur is more
willing to wait for a better idea as he brainstorms, and to wait for a more favorable share
offer as he raises funds. The tradeoff between costly waiting, and the desire to implement
good ideas with favorable share offers, is what governs the entrepreneur’s strategies.
The entrepreneur’s value to participating in the game (his expected value of brainstorming)
decreases in σE ; the more precise his information, the better his ability to determine whether
an idea merits pursuing, as well as avoid costly fundraising on suboptimal ideas. If the
entrepreneur’s signal had infinite variance, his prior on q ∗ would be unaffected by q E ;
his own signal would give him no new information. In this infinite variance case, the
entrepreneur would not exercise a reservation strategy in the brainstorming phase, as further
brainstorming would be strictly dominated, the value to brainstorming independent of his
private signal. He would always proceed from brainstorming to fundraising, regardless of
the signal.
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The entrepreneur’s reservation strategies also interact with the investor’s zero-profit condition. When pitched an idea, the investor knows the entrepreneur must have seen a certain
minimum signal. The investor’s share offer is conditioned on the entrepreneur’s having
achieved that minimum signal. The entrepreneur is in turn aware of that conditioning, and
such awareness impacts his strategies, and so on.
We now consider the relative role that selection plays in this economy. Since the investor
cannot observe the quality of the entrepreneur, we might suspect that the pooling that
occurs in the above equilibrium is indicative of adverse selection. Indeed, if entrepreneurs
were only able to fundraise a single idea and could only fundraise once, then this would
be a greater concern; in that model, all entrepreneurs would desperately proceed to implementation. Here, entrepreneurs have different preferences depending on their “type”.
Entrepreneurs with high-quality ideas want to proceed to implementation with a generous share offer, while entrepreneurs with lower-quality ideas may not want to proceed to
implementation at all, unless the share offer were exceedingly generous. This induces the
following curve that defines the entrepreneur’s decision whether or not to implement:
0

SR (m, n) = 1 −

Em W (m0 , n + 1, s̃(m0 , n, m))
EX(m, n)

!

This is the function that yields the nth share offer at which an entrepreneur with posterior
mean m (after seeing s) is indifferent between proceeding to implementation and not. We
might ask, as investors make increasingly generous share offers, which entrepreneurs are
they attracting? If it is solely the left tail of the distribution, then this would be a negative
result. It would indicate that increased participation in the market, in the form of issuing
share offers that will attract a wider consumer base, can only be detrimental to the investor.
A more economically positive result would be that it always attracts entrepreneurs at both
tails of the distribution. Surprisingly, we find an intermediate result, shown in Figure 2.
There is an interval s1 < s < s2 such that increasingly generous share offers attract entrepreneurs at both tails of the distribution. The intuition is that over this interval, the
higher quality entrepreneurs are pickier. Since their expected revenues are so large, the
return on waiting for a better share offer outweighs the search costs cF and depreciation
rate β. These are precisely the agents that investors are seeking to attract when they make
a more generous offer, and they are successful in doing so over this interval. For s < s1 , the
classic concern dominates.

15

1.3. Baseline Cases
As a baseline measure, consider the following three cases: (1) the entrepreneur and the
investor both observe q ∗ directly, (2) only the entrepreneur does, and (3) only the investor
does. The first case is tantamount to solving the social planner’s problem, and the remaining
two cases can be used to measure the cost of uncertainty. We will compare the definition
of EV (m) across the baseline cases and the full model, as it represents the ex ante welfare
of the entrepreneur.
Case 1
Consider σE = σI = 0. The entrepreneur directly observes q ∗ in brainstorming, and knows
the investor will also observe q ∗ . The entrepreneur correctly predicts all forthcoming share
offers, and will not proceed to fundraising with an idea unless he knows a corresponding
share offer will be acceptable. All ideas carried into fundraising will be implemented immediately after the first share offer; both sides know the probability of fundraising more
than once is zero. This makes the value function in brainstorming after a posterior mean
of mE = q E = q ∗ equal to

∗

V (mE ) = V (q ∗ ) = −cB + β max{Eq V (q ∗ ), −cF + βX(q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))}

where

s(m) = s(q ∗ ) =

K
β (q ∗ + Ψ(K, σR , β, q ∗ ))

Combining these two equations with the definition of X, we have

∗

V (q ∗ ) = −cB + β max{Eq V (q ∗ ), −cF + β(1 − s(q ∗ )) (q ∗ + Ψ(K, σR , β, q ∗ ))}

Here the first element in the max operator is constant, while the second slot is increasing
in q ∗ : There is a single reservation strategy, which we denote here by r, and use to express
the expectation of the value function:
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∗

∗

Eq V (q ∗ ) = −cB + β[p(q ∗ < r)Eq V (q ∗ )
∗

+ p(q ∗ > r)Eq [(−cF + β(1 − s(q ∗ )) (q ∗ + Ψ(K, σR , β, q ∗ )) |q ∗ > r)]] (1.3.1)

Rearrange to solve for the expectation of the value function, and plug in the appropriate
normal CDFs:

∗

q∗

∗

E V (q ) =

q
∗
∗
∗
∗
−cB + β(1 − Φ( r−µ
σN ))E [(−cF + β(1 − s(q )) (q + Ψ(K, σR , β, q )) |q > r)]

1 − βΦ( r−µ
σN )
= −cF + β(1 − s(r)) (r + Ψ(K, σR , β, r))

(1.3.2)

The second equality, required by the definition of the reservation signal r, is enough to solve
for our one unknown r. With r in hand, we are able to define EV (q ∗ ) via equation 1.3.1.
With that in hand, V (q ∗ ) is defined piecewise above.
Case 2
Consider σE = 0, σI > 0. Now when only the entrepreneur observes the signal directly,
there is the possibility of fundraising multiple times: Though the entrepreneur knows the
true quality of his idea, if the investor receives a poor signal, the share offer may still
be lower than desirable to the entrepreneur. However, it is convenient that once the entrepreneur proceeds to fundraising, he will never revert back to brainstorming, since no
new information is revealed in the fundraising stage; no share offer could arrive that would
make the entrepreneur want to abandon his current idea. The entrepreneur will proceed to
implementation when the share offer he receives is sufficiently desirable.
Denote the reservation signal in brainstorming as r1 . The reservation strategy in fundraising
can be expressed as a signal as a function of s. For every idea of accurately perceived quality
q ∗ , the entrepreneur implements with any share offer less than a maximal s, or equivalently,
whenever the investor’s signal q I > r2 (q ∗ ) since the share offer function is monotonic and
fully revealing. Since from the entrepreneur’s standpoint, there is no longer any uncertainty
as to a project’s quality interacting with the desire for a good share offer, the entrepreneur
does follow reservation strategy in the fundraising phase governing his decision to implement
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or continue fundraising.
The value of being in brainstorming with a posterior mean of mE = q E = q ∗ is given by
V (q ∗ ), while the value of being in fundraising with the same mean and a share offer s is
given by W (q ∗ , s). These functions are defined by the equations

∗

I

V (q ∗ ) = −cB + β max{Eq V (q ∗ ), Eq W (q ∗ , s(q I ))}
I

W (q ∗ , s) = −cF + β max{Eq W (q ∗ , s(q I )), X(q ∗ , s)}

Bound by the zero expected profit condition, the investor follows

s(q I ) =

K
β

R∞
−∞

(q ∗

+ Ψ(K, σR

, β, q ∗ )) p(q ∗ |q I , q ∗

≥ r1 , q I ≥ r2 (q ∗ ))dRdq ∗

The probability of the entrepreneur’s acceptance is not shown in this equation since it
cancels during rearrangement of the zero-profit condition. With this share offer function in
mind, the expected value of returning to fundraising is

I

I

Eq W (q ∗ , s(q I )) = −cF + β[p(q I < r2 (q ∗ ))Eq W (q ∗ , s(q I ))
I

+ p(q I ≥ r2 (q ∗ ))Eq [X(q ∗ , s(q I ))|q I ≥ r2 (q ∗ )]] (1.3.3)

Rearranging, this yields
I

I

Eq W (q ∗ , s(q I )) =

−cF + βp(q I ≥ r2 (q ∗ ))Eq [X(q ∗ , s(q I ))|q I ≥ r2 (q ∗ )]
1 − βp(q I < r2 (q ∗ ))

(1.3.4)

The reservation function r2 (q ∗ ) is now pinned down by the condition

I

Eq W (q ∗ , s(q I )) = X(q ∗ , s(r2 (q ∗ )))

I

With this reservation function in hand, Eq W (q ∗ , s(q I )) is now well-defined for all q ∗ . The
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brainstorm reservation signal r1 is now found through the condition

∗

I

Eq W (r1 , s(q I )) = Eq V (q ∗ )

With this reservation signal in hand, V (q ∗ ) is now defined. As desired we can compute
∗

Eq V (q ∗ ).
Case 3
Finally, consider σE > 0, σI = 0. Now only the investor observes the signal directly. The
share offer s(·) is a direct function of m = q I = q ∗ , and so it may be given as

s(q ∗ ) =

β

(q ∗

K
+ Ψ(K, σR , β, q ∗ ))

The entrepreneur will have a posterior mean m in the brainstorming phase, constructed after
viewing his own noisy signal q E . In the fundraising phase, however, the entrepreneur will
accurately deduce the true q ∗ from a single share offer. The investor knows the entrepreneur
will make this deduction; and so, being aware of the entrepreneur’s strategy, the investor
knows before making his share offer whether the offer will be accepted or rejected. It is
meaningless to include any acceptance/rejection probabilities in the share offer function. It
is now easier to comprehend the concept of the multiplicity of equilibria. When the investor
knows an offer he makes will be rejected, he can also make any other offer he knows will
similarly be rejected still earn zero profit. Above a certain threshold share offering, the
investor can choose any number of odd mappings—not necessarily monotonic—and mixing
strategies, simply because he knows any s above the threshold will be rejected anyway.
The value functions in brainstorming and fundraising are

∗

E

V (mE ) = −cB + β max{Em V (mE ), Eq [W (q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|mE ]}
E

W (q ∗ , s) = −cF + β max{Em V (mE ), X(q ∗ , s)}

As in Case 2, we have a reservation mean in the brainstorming phase which we will denote
by r1 . There is also a reservation share offer in the fundraising phase which we will denote
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by r2 (q ∗ ).

1

The function r2 (q ∗ ) satisfies

E

Em V (mE ) = X(q ∗ , r2 (q ∗ ))

Interestingly, the value of implementing at the reservation share offer is now independent of
the quality of the idea. This is the case in any version of this model with a terminal condition
(maximum number of fundraising periods), since the reservation share offer makes the
entrepreneur indifferent between implementation and brainstorming anew, and the expected
value of brainstorming is independent of quality.
Meanwhile, in brainstorming, the reservation mean r1 is satisfies

∗

E

Em V (mE ) = Eq [W (q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|r1 ]

We can write the expected value of returning to brainstorming as

E

E

Em V (mE ) = −cB + βp(mE < r1 )Em V (mE )
E

∗

+ βp(mE ≥ r1 )Em [Eq [W (q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|mE ]|mE > r1 ] (1.3.5)

While the expected value of continuing to fundraising from brainstorming is

∗

E

Eq [W (q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|mE ] = −cF + βp(s(q ∗ ) > r2 (q ∗ )|mE )Em V (mE )
∗

+ βp(s(q ∗ ) ≤ r2 (q ∗ )|mE )Eq [X(q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|s(q ∗ ) ≤ r2 (q ∗ ), mE ] (1.3.6)

Combining equations 1.3.5 and 1.3.6, we arrive at
In Case 2, r2 (q ∗ ) was a reservation investor signal; here we parametrize the object as a share offer but
use the same notation. Though the object’s type may differ, r is used repeatedly to denote “reservation
strategy” to avoid a proliferation of notation.
1
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E

Em V (mE ) =

1
×
1 − βp(mE < r1 ) − βp(mE ≥ r1 )Eq∗ [p(s(q ∗ ) > r2 (q ∗ ))]
E

(−cB − βp(mE ≥ r1 )cF + βEm [p(s(q ∗ ) ≤ r2 (q ∗ )|mE )×
∗

Eq [X(q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|s(q ∗ ) < r2 (q ∗ ), mE ]|mE ≥ r1 ] (1.3.7)

E

This pins down Em V (mE ) in terms of r1 and r2 (q ∗ ). Plugging this definition into 1.3.6
∗

then yields Eq [W (q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|mE ] in terms of reservation strategies as well. The equations

E

Em V (mE ) = X(q ∗ , r2 (q ∗ ))
∗

E

Em V (mE ) = Eq [W (q ∗ , s(q ∗ ))|r1 ]

then define r1 and r2 (q ∗ ) precisely. As in the preceding cases, these equations can be solved
E

numerically. With reservation strategies pinned down, we may evaluate Em V (mE ) and
compare with cases 1 and 2, as desired.

1.4. Overconfidence
We extend the model to explore the welfare effects of overconfidence on an economy. Given
the setup of the model, this may be accomplished by adding a bias term of φ to the
2 ). The entrepreneur believes
entrepreneur’s signal distribution, so now qφE ∼ N (q ∗ + φ, σE

φ = 0, but in reality φ > 0.
Consider the entrepreneur after a period of brainstorming. He has a prior mean of µ, and
has drawn a signal qφE . Comparing the accurate posterior mean on q ∗ , denoted as before by
mE , with the overconfident posterior mean which we denote by mE
φ , we have

2
mE
φ = γ (0)

qφE
µ
+
2
2
σN
σE

!
= γ 2 (0)

qφE + φ − φ
µ
+
2
2
σN
σE

!
= mE +γ 2 (0)

2
σN
φ
E
=
m
+φ
2
2 + σ2
σE
σN
E

The posterior mean shifts up linearly in φ. The brainstorming reservation mean (marked
by indifference between fundraising and continued brainstorming, denoted by mR
1 and cor-
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responding to signal q1R ) is now reached more easily, though possibly artificially. The true
posterior mean for which the entrepreneur is willing to leave brainstorming has shifted linearly downward, meaning the overconfident entrepreneur will seek funding for some ideas
of lower quality than he would otherwise require.
In the fundraising phase, two information structures can be considered: The investor either
knows or does not know the entrepreneur is overconfident. In the latter case, the s(·)
function remains unchanged. We consider the former, in which s(·) becomes

sφ (q I ) =

β

R∞ R∞
−∞

K
β

Rp(R|q ∗ )p(q ∗ |q I , q E

K
+ φ ≥ q1R , q E + φ ∈ QE (sM (q I )))dRdq ∗

Now φ > 0 implies sφ (q I ) > s(q I ) for all q I . The investor, realizing entrepreneurs are
pursuing lower quality ideas on average, demands higher compensation to meet the zeroprofit condition. But the entrepreneur, believing φ = 0, incorrectly deduces the signal to
I
have been qφI = s−1 (s) < s−1
φ (s) = q ; his perception of the investor’s signal is artificially

low. After seeking fundraising for n periods, the entrepreneur’s posterior mean is given by

mφ (n) = γ 2 (n)

P I!
qφE
qφ
µ
= m(n) + γ 2 (n)
+ 2 +
2
2
σN
σE
σI

φ
2 +
σE

!
P I
(qφ − q I )
σI2

Since the summation term is negative, the two terms in the large parentheses work in
conflict, and are weighted by the entrepreneur by the relative signal precisions. This expression demonstrates that repeated interactions with VC firms mitigate potential problems
of overconfidence.
Studying such a problem only explores the effect of an individual’s overconfidence on himself
or herself. Another compelling question is the effect of overconfident individuals on an entire
entrepreneurial economy. We explore this issue by considering the existence of a continuum
of entrepreneurs with some distribution of overconfidence levels, where an entrepreneur’s
type is unobservable to the investor. A fraction λ of the population are unbiased, and a
fraction 1 − λ have φ > 0. Now the investor’s share offer function is

sφ (q I ) =
where
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K
D

Z Z

∞

D=β
K
β

Rp(R|q ∗ )(λp(q ∗ |q I , q E ≥ q1R , q E ∈ QE (sM (q I )))
+ (1 − λ)p(q ∗ |q I , q E + φ ≥ q1R , q E + φ ∈ QE (sM (q I ))))dRdq ∗ (1.4.1)

Once again, φ > 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1) implies sφ (q I ) > s(q I ) for all q I : The investor, realizing
some entrepreneurs are pursuing lower quality ideas but unable to observe who, demands
higher compensation.
One of two information structures must be assumed: Unbiased entrepreneurs either know
sφ (q I ) or still falsely believe s(q I ). This choice in information structure has implications
for QE ; given a share offer, the set of private signals for which the entrepreneur implements would be different between the two. In either information structure, both types
of entrepreneur are negatively impacted by the overconfident fraction: Overconfident entrepreneurs implement lower-quality ideas than they would with correct beliefs, and unbiased entrepreneurs face lower share offers from the investor who cannot distinguish types.
Additionally, discouraged unbiased entrepreneurs who are unaware of the overconfident
fraction might receive lower signals than what they might otherwise accept with knowledge
of the overconfident population—hence a form of adverse selection caused by the existence
of an overconfident contingent.
Furthermore, as the new share offer function reflects, if in each period an investor is to
receive a single pitch uniformly selected from the population of entrepreneurs proceeding
to fundraising (and recalling the investor believes n = 1), an even greater fraction than
1 − λ of the pitches the investor receives will be from overconfident entrepreneurs—more
than the population average, since overconfident entrepreneurs are more likely to draw
private signals that exceed their reservation strategies. We observe adverse selection by
entrepreneurs during both brainstorming and fundraising stages.

1.5. Numerical Results
The model’s dynamic feedback characteristic induces a system of Volterra integral equations
that is numerically tractable through value function iteration. A numerical solution to the
case in which both signal variances are positive is found in MATLAB. The algorithm is
described in Appendix 1.B; this section analyzes the results.
The plots in Figure 1 show (1) the value to being in the brainstorming phase, across posterior
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means m, (2) the value to being in the fundraising phase, across posterior means m for a
preselected (n, s), (3) the evolution of the first reservation strategy across iterations, and
(4) the expected value of going into fundraising from the brainstorm stage, across posterior
means m. In the first plot, the kink occurs at the first reservation strategy. To the left
of the kink, the value function is linear, since for all m below a minimum threshold, the
entrepreneur finds it optimal to reject the current idea and brainstorm a new one. To
the right of the kink, the value function is strictly increasing, since higher posterior means
suggest a greater share of higher returns. The second and fourth plots exhibit a similar
shape. The kinks in the third plot suggest a non-monotonic convergence pattern for the
first reservation strategy.
Figure 2 plots the reservation share offer as a non-monotonic function of the posterior mean.
This plot is relevant during the fundraising stage, and what it demonstrates is that there
exists an s∗ such that: For all s < s∗ , the reservation mean follows a simple cutoff rule. For
all s < s∗ , the entrepreneur chooses to implement on a closed interval of reservation means,
the intuition being that for high investor signals, the entrepreneur would rather search again
to secure a more favorable share offer.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of overconfidence on an entrepreneur’s beliefs, and how overconfidence can lead to adverse selection. s(q I ) is the share offer function in an economy
without overconfidence. sφ (q I ) is the share offer function in an economy exhibiting the
simplest form of entrepreneurial overconfidence: All entrepreneurs are overconfident, and
investors are aware of this fact. Observe that for all q I , sφ (q I ) > s(q I ). This is because the
entrepreneur is more likely to observe a signal satisfying his first reservation strategy, so
the investor’s prior is less favorable; as a result, the investor must demand a greater share
to break even. The overconfident entrepreneur is not aware of sφ (q I ), and believes s(q I ) to
be the investor’s share offer function. Using s(q I ), the entrepreneur deduces a false investor
signal, qφI , which is necessarily lower than the true q I . Misinformation in the brainstorming
and fundraising stages induces adverse entrepreneurial search decisions.
Figure 4 compares the shapes of the m(q I ) function for two entrepreneurial signal variances, σE = .5 and 2. Recall that m(q I ), derived in Appendix 1.D, is the function that
returns the investor’s posterior mean on true idea quality given a signal. Why should this
function depend on the entrepreneur’s signal variance? The answer lies in the fact that the
investor conditions his posterior on the knowledge that the entrepreneur’s signal exceeded
a minimum threshold during brainstorming. This information is more meaningful when the
entrepreneur’s signal is more precise.
A real-world example can be considered as follows. Suppose an investor gets a signal of poor
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quality on a venture, but sees that the team pitching the idea has a track record of successful
startups, and is therefore qualified to make a sound evaluation. The investor would take
this experienced team’s enthusiasm into consideration more so than than he would an
inexperienced team’s. On the right side of the m(q I ) plots, where q I is relatively high,
the two functions are close in value, because the investor and entrepreneur “agree” that the
venture is worthwhile. On the left side, the two plots diverge with greater “disagreement”.
In the σE = .5 case, the entrepreneur is more precise, and so the investor is more willing
to consider the entrepreneur’s enthusiasm than in the σE = 2 case, even when the investor
himself is pessimistic in both cases.

1.6. Conclusion
This model was originally motivated by a stark stylized fact of the venture capital industry:
entrepreneurs are overconfident. Since venture capital firms as well as entrepreneurs hold
private information and communicate with each other in repeated, structured environments,
we were a priori surprised by this fact, as it indicates that there are frictions in the venture
capital industry, and that the mechanisms of transmitting information between each side
of the economy are imperfect.
We analyze the information transfer problem from the perspective of a search model, in
which entrepreneurs seek both good ideas and favorable equity contracts, and firms seek
entrepreneurs with good ideas. Because the model was initially motivated by studying the
flow of information to entrepreneurs, we restrict ourselves to the case of actuarially fair
share offers by venture capital firms, and are still able to generate nontrivial and wholly
unexpected dynamics. Though the model was constructed with the idea of search frictions
in mind, one of the primary results finds advantageous selection to be a significant factor
in equilibrium. A classical concern in venture capital economies is that since firms cannot
perfectly distinguish entrepreneurs with good ideas from those with bad ideas, equilibrium
induced by actuarially fair prices will be characterized by a proliferation of the latter.
We find the opposite holds. As investors make increasingly generous equity contracts,
entrepreneurs are added to both tails of the distribution of those willing to proceed to
implementation. We argue this is because entrepreneur preferences align with the traditional
investor’s incentives; both prefer implementing high-quality projects. We recognize this
result may break down if intrinsic, static types were to be added to the entrepreneurial
pool—if some entrepreneurs systematically generated worse ideas than others, different
results may be obtained. However, in the baseline model, since incentives are aligned and
all available information is transmitted actionably and perfectly to the entrepreneur, we
argue that a socially optimal outcome is achieved.
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Pursuing the initial stylized fact of the economy, we then introduce overconfidence. This
is both in the form of analyzing the effect of overconfidence on a single individual, and
the effect of persistent overconfidence in a fixed proportion of the economy. In the case
where all entrepreneurs are overconfident, we show that the investor pool can help mitigate
the effect of such bias through repeated communication. However, in the case where only
a fixed proportion of the investor pool is overconfident, this ability dwindles. We thus
provide a stylized explanation for how overconfidence can persist in an economy despite
regular communication with rational firms holding accurate beliefs, the key mechanism
being that while an individual may be aware of the existence of overconfidence, it is difficult
to construct an information transmission mechanism that will allow a firm to convince a
particular individual of his own overconfidence. This is a problem: Though the incentives
between entrepreneur and investor are still aligned, the beliefs over what is considered
optimal startup behavior become misaligned. We demonstrate that this misalignment has
negative welfare effects.
Extensions
The model can be used to study other aspects of venture capital economies. To encourage
further research within this environment, we suggest a few potentially promising veins.
Relaxing the assumption of investor naivety will enable researchers to learn how histories
of declined equity contracts can affect future share offers. To keep the solution tractable,
researchers may wish to approach the problem by structurally imposing a maximum length
of fundraising time, x; that is, after x periods of fundraising an entrepreneur must choose
between brainstorming and implementing. Instead of believing n = 1 in all cases, investors
may either view n perfectly or they take an expectation of n over {1, ...x}.
Individual profit-seeking investors can be considered instead of investor “pools” bidding
for the right to enter a contract. A venture capitalist wishing to maximize profits faces
an interesting tradeoff. By demanding a greater share of realized returns, he increases his
utility from each contract implemented—but at the same time, he raises the probability that
the entrepreneur will decline his offer and approach a different investor next period. In this
environment competition still exists within the venture capital market; now the competition
is intertemporal, and the investor’s bargaining power is limited by the entrepreneur’s ability
to continue seeking funding elsewhere. The dynamics of informational asymmetry and
transfer become more complex in such a model, and the investor’s beliefs or knowledge
about n would continue to affect the optimal share offer function. An environment with
individual profit-seeking investors will likely give rise to new and informative equilibrium
concepts.
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The baseline environment lends itself well to the study of learning by doing, and how the
capacity for an entrepreneur to improve his ideas over time, or his discerning ability, can
affect how investors propose equity contracts and how entrepreneurs search. Learning by
doing would affect the way investors interact with individuals who have advanced learning,
or with everyone, depending on how well investors can distinguish types. Researchers will
have to decide how the learning factor will emerge: deterministically or probabilistically,
after each period of brainstorming or only after downward movement to brainstorming from
fundraising, and as an increase in µ or as a reduction in σE .
Another direction we propose would examine the “caste system” of VC firms—that is, the
heterogeneity of firms with respect to reputation, profitability, deal flow, and consequently,
behavior. Researchers might consider an environment that would permit strategic behavior
by VCs who are heterogeneous in reputation, which would affect the likelihood of receiving
scarce proposals by entrepreneurs. Construction would be consistent with the data in Hsu
(2004), which finds high-reputation firms to be three times more likely to have their offers
accepted, and at a (10-14%) discount. Due to the increased deal flow, such firms can be
more patient with the ideas they fund. Having a top tier reputation allows breathing room
if the VC fund underperforms, but prolonged underperformance threatens a demotion to a
lower tier. This type of paper could preserve the environment of search and informational
asymmetry, and shift the strategic focus to the VC side, examining the effect of reputation
on behavior.
Finally, we propose an analysis of the economy using Monte Carlo simulation, which will
enable precise estimation of several interesting objects, including: a distribution of quality
of implemented projects; a distribution of search time, in total and broken down by stages;
and the average difference between the “overconfident” and unbiased posterior means as a
function of the number of share offers. Such an analysis should study how these objects
change in σE and σI .
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Appendix 1.A.
Timeline and Feedback Cycle

Brainstorm begins; nature draws true quality

q∗

Nature draws entrepreneur’s private signal
qE

Entrepreneur acts

Brainstorm

Fund raise

Nature draws investor’s “private” signal
qI

Investor makes fully revealing share offer
s

Entrepreneur acts
Reject offer;
Brainstorm

Implement
keep fundraising
Nature draws returns
R

Returns divided according to equity contract
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Appendix 1.B.
Programming Method for Numerical Solution
A numerical solution is found using value function iteration in MATLAB. We begin by
choosing baseline parameters as follows:

Parameter

Value

β

0.95

µ

2

σN

5

σE

.5

σI

1

σR

1

cB

.1

cF

.1

K

1

In various experiments, these parameters are changed. We now construct discrete grids
for the posterior mean and share offer. Though the posterior mean can theoretically take
any value on the real line, we constrain the grid of mlength points to within five standard
deviations σN around µ. The share offer grid remains on (0, 1). Each venture requires a
maximum number of fundraising periods; this is chosen to be nlength = 5.
A number expV representing the entrepreneur’s expected value when entering the brainstorming phase is initialized with a best guess of zeros. A [mlength, nlength] matrix called
expW is also initialized with zeros; this contains the expected value when entering the
fundraising phase given any combination of posterior mean m and signals drawn n. We
similarly make an initial guess for the first reservation strategy. A vector v, representing
the current value at brainstorming for any posterior mean, is initialized, and populated
using a reasonable piecewise function with linear segments. A [mlength, nlength, slength]
array called w is initialized and populated according to a similar initial guess; w contains
the values at fundraising given any posterior mean m, signals drawn n, and share offer s.
Another vector is initialized to track the brainstorming reservation strategy as it converges.
Functions are coded for p(m0 |m, n), s(m), s̃(m0 , n, m), q I (m), m(q I ), and X(m, n, s). Since
some of these functions are heavy on integrals and slow to compute, in some cases, values
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are presolved and stored in an array; interpolated approximations are also used.
The value function iteration algorithm works as follows. For brevity in, numbers in parentheses following a vector, matrix, or array correspond to values instead of indices. On each
iteration, the number expV is updated by taking the expectation across values in vector
v using the appropriate distribution. Each entry in expW is updated in a similar fashion.
res1 is updated to be the value m for which abs(expV − expW (m, 1)) is minimized. Finally,
v and w are updated by plugging in the latest expV and expW into

v(m) = −cB + βmax{expV, expW (m, 1)}, ∀m
w(m, n, s) = −cF + βmax{expV, expW (m, n + 1), X(m, n, s)}, ∀m, n, s

Iteration continues to until the value functions converge. Resulting graphs are shown in
Figure 1.
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Appendix 1.C.
Plots

Figure 1: Value function plots and reservation strategy evolution.

Figure 2: Reservation share offer as a non-monotonic function of posterior mean.
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Figure 3: Effects of overconfidence: sφ (·) > s(·) and qφI < q I

Figure 4: A comparison of the m(q I ) function for σE = .5 and σE = 2.
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Appendix 1.D.
Derivations of p(m0 |m, n), s̃(m0 , n, m), and reparametrized s(·)
A mathematical exercise which occurs frequently in this analysis is the following. Suppose
2 ). Further suppose that x|θ ∼ N (θ, σ 2 ), and that θ is unobserved. What then
θ ∼ N (µ, σN
I

is the total probability distribution p(x)? Consider the random variable Z = N (0, σI2 ).
Then we have

x=θ+Z
Thus, by standard formulas for the sum of normal distributions, we have that the uncondi2 + σ 2 ).
tional distribution of x is given by x ∼ N (µ, σN
I

We now employ this result to find p(m0 |m, n). The expression for the current posterior
mean m is

m = γ 2 (n)



Pn

I
t=1 qt
2
σI

qE
2 +
σE

+

µ
2
σN



While next period’s posterior mean m0 is given by

m0 = γ 2 (n + 1)

qE
2 +
σE

0

Pn

I
I
qn+1
µ
t=1 qt
+
+ 2
2
2
σI
σI
σN

!

Since m0 follows from m, combining these two equations yields
0

m0 = γ 2 (n + 1)

qI
m
+ 2
2
γ (n)
σI

!
=

γ 2 (n + 1) I 0 γ 2 (n + 1)
m
q +
γ 2 (n)
σI2

(1.D.1)

We now apply the above fact to determine the entrepreneur’s beliefs regarding the distri0

bution of q I :

q ∗ |m, n ∼ N (m, γ 2 (n))
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0

q I |m, n, q ∗ ∼ N (q ∗ , σI2 )
0

⇒ q I |m, n ∼ N (m, γ 2 (n) + σI2 )

It follows that


γ 2 (n)γ 2 (n + 1)
m |m, n ∼ N m,
σI2
0

The function s̃(m0 , n, m) conveniently follows from equation 1.D.1 above, using the s function from 1.2.8:


0

s̃(m , n, m) = s

m0 σI2
mσI2
−
γ 2 (n + 1) γ 2 (n)


(1.D.2)

We will now parametrize s(·) as function not of the investor’s signal, but as a function
of the investor’s beliefs about q ∗ . This is useful for the numerical solution. Begin by
defining m(q I ), a function which delivers the investor’s posterior mean mI given a signal q I ,
conditional on the knowledge that q E exceeded the entrepreneur’s first reservation signal:

I

I

Z

m = m(q ) =

RR
∗

∗

I

E

q p(q |q , q ≥

q1R )dq ∗

q1R

= RR

q ∗ p(q I |q ∗ )p(q E |q ∗ )p(q ∗ )dq E dq ∗

q1R

p(q I |q ∗ )p(q E |q ∗ )p(q ∗ )dq E dq ∗

(1.D.3)

Evaluating the integral in the denominator of 1.2.8 yields:
Z

(q ∗ + Ψ(K, σN , β, q ∗ ))p(q ∗ |q I , q E ≥ q1R )dq ∗
RR

= m(q I ) +

q1R

Ψ(K, σN , β, q ∗ )p(q I |q ∗ )p(q E |q ∗ )p(q ∗ )dq E dq ∗
RR
I ∗
E ∗
∗
E ∗
q R p(q |q )p(q |q )p(q )dq dq
1

Since we prefer s(·) to be a function of posterior means, not signals, we change variables
and normalize, defining q(mI ) to be the functional inverse of m(q I ):
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s(mI ) =

RR
β

mI +

K
!
∗ )p(q(mI )|q ∗ )p(q E |q ∗ )p(q ∗ )dq E dq ∗
Ψ(K,
σ
,
β,
q
N
q1R
RR
I
∗
E ∗
∗
E ∗
q R p(q(m )|q )p(q |q )p(q )dq dq
1
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(1.D.4)

Appendix 1.E.
Notation Guide

Variable

Meaning

q∗

true idea quality

qE

entrepreneur’s signal

qI

investor’s signal

µ

prior mean of q ∗

2
σN

prior variance of q ∗

2
σE

entrepreneur’s signal variance

σI2

investor’s signal variance

2
σR

variance of returns

β

discount factor

K

non-pecuniary capital requirement

R

return

cB

flow cost of brainstorming

cF

flow cost of fundraising

ρ

risk aversion

mE

posterior mean on q ∗ at brainstorming

m

posterior mean on q ∗

n

number of investor signals received

V (·)

value to entrepreneur in brainstorming

W (·)

value to entrepreneur in fundraising

X(·)

value to entrepreneur at implementation

s(·)

investor’s share offer function

s̃(m0 , n, m)
Ψ()

share offer required to move from (m, n) to m0
mean bias function due to normal truncation
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p(m0 |m, n)
γ 2 (n)

probability of going from (m, n) to m0
posterior variance on q ∗ after n investor signals

q1R

reservation signal in brainstorming

mR
1

reservation mean in brainstorming

mR
2 (n)

first reservation mean in fundraising

mR
3 (n, s)

second reservation mean in fundraising

sR
3 (n, m)

second reservation share offer in fundraising

φ

overconfidence bias

qφE

overconfidence-biased signal in brainstorming

qφI

entrepreneur’s bias-tainted perception of investor’s signal after offer sφ

mE
φ

overconfidence-biased posterior mean on q ∗ in brainstorming

λ
sφ (·)

fraction of unbiased entrepreneurs
investor’s share offer function, corrected for overconfidence
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CHAPTER 2 : A Theory of Gender Income Differentials, Occupation Choice, and
Childcare Regulation
Abstract. Though the gender earnings differential attributed to workplace discrimination and social pressures has diminished over time, the gap due to unexplained factors
has remained constant. This paper attempts to shed light on the gender earnings differential using a model of occupational choice, maternity choice, and the ability to
stochastically “wage climb.” The model is solved analytically and numerically, yielding a result for the man and woman’s normalized income that is consistent with the
empirical gender wage gap. The result is driven by the fact that a woman’s optimal occupational choice is a shorter-term investment made to accommodate the potential for
time out of the labor force following maternity. The model is then extended to include
a child day care services component. Results are consistent with empirical findings that
regulation, and hence prices, in childcare services reduce demand and discourage female
labor participation. A relationship is established between childcare services regulation
and the gender wage gap.

2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. The Gender Wage Gap
It is a well-known fact that in almost every country, the earnings of men exceed those of
women. Gender income differentials have been attributed to a variety of causes, including
differences in industry choice, choices in the types of positions held within an industry, discrimination due to sexism and/or variations in labor mobility as explained by monopsony
theory, work experience, marginal productivities, and cultural pressures and other sociological factors. Such income gaps have also been identified using a variety of measures. The gap
is generally given by a statistic reflecting female earnings as a percentage of male earnings;
“earnings” might be hourly wages, weekly earnings, or annual salaries, and may be reflected
by a median or an average. Comparisons differ in their usefulness, as certain facts may bias
estimates. For instance, men work more hours on average, and tend to select into fields
with average higher pay. 2008 OECD estimates of median earnings of full-time employees
reflect an average differential of 18% for OECD countries. For the U.S., the differential was
19%.
The seminal book by Becker (1957) on prejudice and the economics of discrimination
sparked an eventual proliferation of microdata-driven research into the study of gender wage
differentials. For instance, the application of the decomposition technique as developed by
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) to microdata enabled the comparison of wages across
Date: December 2015
Key words and phrases. Gender wage gap
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genders while controlling for productivity levels.
Surveys of the ample literature on the gender wage differential—which span a wide range
of countries, motivations, and classes of data—have struggled to condense results in a way
that facilitates meaningful meta-analysis. Successful meta-analysis has been conducted by
Stanley and Jarrell (1998), who identify causes and sources of variation in the U.S. wage
gap, and Jarrell and Stanley (2004), who expand their former dataset. Weichselbaumer and
Winter-Ebmer (2005) extend the analysis of these papers to a worldwide level, studying
more than 260 published adjusted pay gap studies for over sixty countries. Their quantitative review of the vast amount of empirical literature on gender earnings differentials
concerns differences in methodology, data, time periods, and countries. The study finds that
over time, raw wage differentials have fallen globally, mostly due to a better labor market
endowment of females, but the “unexplained component” of the gap remains unchanged.
The constancy of the unexplained component is further substantiated by the U.S. Congress
Joint Economic Committee, which finds that as explained inequities decrease, the unexplained pay gap remains unchanged (see Figure 5). Furthermore, Blau and Kahn (2007)
find that despite evidence suggesting a decline in discrimination against working women,
the convergence between wages of men and women has declined in recent years, and “the
possibility arises that the narrowing of the gender pay gap will not continue into the future.”
The current paper proposes a model that attempts to shed light on the “unexplained pay
gap” that persists despite observable decreases in workplace discrimination, cultural pressures, and other factors to which gender differentials have been attributed. The mechanism
hinges on the assumption that the mere possibility of a future maternity decision affects
the optimal vocational choice for women. In the model, men and women begin working
life by choosing an occupation. As time progresses, workers of either gender attempt to
climb the job by seeking higher paying positions, which arrive stochastically as a function
of the requested wage increase. Occupations are heterogeneous in their growth potential,
a parameter that governs the probability of earning a promotion conditional on a worker’s
current wage. Example “high ladder” industries might be investment banking or corporate
law, which promise ample opportunity to climb in rank and pay grade over time, contrasted
with “low ladder” occupations like librarianship or restaurant services, which do not. The
theory finds that, faced with a potential maternity choice, female workers find it optimal
to choose jobs associated with a lower ladder than those of males.
2.1.2. Relating Maternity Choice to Income and Occupation
The results of the current model are consistent with the inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and fertility generally seen in the data. Using 1968-1988 data from the
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National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, Waldfogel (1997) finds that women undergo a 4% wage penalty for having one child and a 12% wage penalty for multiple children.
For other similar examples, see Budig and England (2001), Rindfuss and Brewster (1996),
and Smith et al. (2001).
Abma and Martinez (2006) use data from the National Survey of Family Growth to study
women aged 35-44 who are voluntarily, temporarily, and involuntarily childless. Here voluntarily childless women are those who are fecund but choose not to have children or are
contraceptively sterile; temporarily childless are those who expect to have children in the
future; and involuntarily childless women are biologically incapable of having children. The
authors find that 11% of voluntarily childless women hold “executive, administrative, and
managerial” or “professional specialty occupations”, compared to 6% among women with
children, and 9% among those who are temporarily childless.
The negative relationship between motherhood and socioeconomic status may be due in part
to educational differences between childless and childbearing women; see Figure 6, adapted
from Livingston and Cohn (2010). However, education gaps between women with and
without children are not as pronounced as the socioeconomic gap, suggesting the reasons
for the latter are deeper, and may be caused an anticipation of incompatibility between the
woman’s role as worker and mother.
2.1.3. Childcare Regulation, Prices, and Demand
The past few decades have seen swift growth in the childcare industry. The U.S. Census
Bureau estimates the existence of 262,511 childcare facilities in 1987, and 766,401 in 2007.
Increased demand has been driven by higher female labor participation rates, as suggested
by Blau (2001), resulting from changes in family structure, a desire to provide young
children with educational opportunities, and other factors. Financial statement analysis
by Sageworks indicates sales among private childcare experienced average annual growth of
6-7% between 2008 and 2012, while other companies’ sales declined 5% on average in 2009.
Recent growth in the childcare market has been accompanied by political and philosophical
debate as to the extent of private versus public responsibility in child rearing, but movement toward federal involvement in childcare began as early as 1933, when the Federal
Economic Recovery Act and the Work Projects Administration specified funding for the
expansion of childcare. With the Community Facilities Act of 1941, the Children’s Bureau
under the Office of Education recommended standards in staff training, staff-child ratios,
nutrition, age ranges, and group sizes in subsidized day care facilities. Though the act was
discontinued after the war and standards were never enforced, stringent procedures and
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regulations would soon follow. Legislation in 1962 would require state licenses for childcare facilities seeking federal funding grants. Ongoing government debates would converge
toward the 1968 Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR), a mandate on a
set of regulations to govern childcare provision, including staff-children ratios by age group
and by staff status (volunteer, clerical, etc), space, meals, ventilation. Administrative bodies were specified. In 1969, President Nixon submitted his Family Assistance Plan (FAP),
which included an estimated 400 new childcare programs to be established in five years.
In consideration of this plan, the 1968 FIDCR would be revised to introduce and enable
more enforceable standards in a 1972 FIDCR, whose authority would extend to in-home as
well as facility-based childcare. Over subsequent decades, national day care studies would
abound, administrative authorities would frequently shift, and regulatory control of day
care services at federal and state levels would grow enormously. A history of regulation
in the childcare industry is found in Phillips and Zigler (1973), and an overview of the
structure of U.S. childcare regulations is found in Heeb and Kilburn (2004).
Complex childcare regulations, on top of other enterprise regulations including zoning laws,
pose serious startup and operational challenges for day care providers today. The Pennsylvania code, for example, specifies a list of general requirements, staff suitability and
ratio requirements, as well as rules for the physical site, fire safety, equipment, programing/activities, admission procedures, child health, adult health, nutrition, transportation,
child records, adult records, special exceptions, and school-age programs. Rules for the physical site alonee space, measurement and use of play space, unsafe areas in outdoor space,
outside walkways, protective electrical covers, toxics, sanitation, smoking, water, indoor
temperature, hot water pipes and sources of heat, ventilation, telephone availability/usage,
emergency phone number posting, first-aid kit availability, building surface requirements,
paint, lighting, firearms, glass, and toilet areas.
The effects of state regulations on childcare prices and choices have been studied by Heeb and
Kilburn (2004) using regulations from state archives and 1990 National Childcare Survey
data. The authors explicitly account for the way regulations increase labor costs to specify a
relationship between staff-to-child ratios and day care prices. Using simultaneous estimation
of prices and wages, and including price and quality-assurance effects of regulations, they
also empirically assess the effect of regulations and quality-assurance on household decisions
for childcare. They find an economically significant effect of regulations on the price of
childcare, which in turn reduces childcare services demand and discourages mothers from
participating in the labor force. No quality assurance effect of regulation on demand is
found.
Using mixed logit and universal logit models on Canadian data, Powell (2002) finds a
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similar result that childcare prices reduce the probability of labor force participation and
opting for childcare services. Her work, along with that of Michalopoulos and Robins (2000),
Kimmel (1998), and Ribar (1992), also uses childcare regulations to identify prices, finding
a strong correlation between strictness and complexity of regulations and the price of day
care services.
The current paper’s baseline model attempts to shed light on the persistent “unexplained”
component of the gender wage gap, the mechanism being that women—in anticipation of
taking time out of the workforce for some period of maternity and childcare—find lowerladder occupations optimal relative to men. The baseline model is also extended to include
an option of day care services for each family. Results of the extended model are consistent with the empirical findings that regulation (hence prices) in childcare services reduce
demand and discourage labor participation among women. Since women expecting to leave
the labor force for an extended time period choose lower-ladder occupations, a connection between childcare regulation and gender income inequality is established, even when
comparing normalized incomes that only examine wages during working periods.
2.1.4. Organization
In what follows, Section 2.2 presents the baseline model. Section 2.3 describes the solution
to the baseline model. Section 2.4 provides numerical analysis. Section 2.5 describes and
solves an extended model that includes an option for day care service, enabling women
to remain to remain in the workforce after childbearing. Section 2.6 provides numerical
analysis for this extended model. Section 2.7 concludes and offers possible extensions to the
baseline model.

2.2. Baseline Model
Consider a model wherein workers live for n periods in discrete time, with impatience given
by β. Workers face a continuum of occupations indexed by a parameter φ ∈ [0, 1], which
governs the evolution of the potential for wage growth. The minimum wage across all
occupations is w. Each occupation has a set of employment positions offering wages on the
support [w, ∞). A worker begins his or her life by choosing an industry, φ. A worker may
enter an occupation by applying to its lowest paying job, which the worker receives with
certainty. Once employed in an occupation, a worker may in each period apply for a raise
of ε ∈ [0, 1]. If received, the then higher-paying job offers a wage of w + ε where w was the
worker’s previous wage. We will refer to this process as “climbing” an industry. If the raise
is denied, the worker keeps his or her current wage. After choosing ε, the worker receives
the promotion with probability:
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1

1

p(w, ε, φ) = (1 − ε) 2 (1 −
1+e

(1−φ)

(−w+µ)
σ

)

(2.2.1)

Here µ and σ are exogenous parameters that specify the shape of the logistic portion of p();
they control the underlying stochastic rates at which industries can be climbed over time.
The intuition behind this probability function is as follows. The first term implies that
the probability of a promotion being accepted is decreasing in the size of the promotion
requested; and the marginal decrease in acceptance probability becomes infinite as the
requested raise approaches one. (E.g., it is more difficult for an analyst to directly become
a company’s vice president than to become a senior analyst first.) The second term, a logistic
function, implies that occupations with high φ are more difficult to climb up front, but over
time show relatively greater promise for career growth. Occupations with low φ are easier
to climb up front, but the opportunity for career growth quickly drops. Hence occupations
with higher φ are more suitable for workers seeking a longer term career investment, and
vice versa. For the purposes of this paper, occupations with high and low φ will respectively
be termed “high ladder” and “low ladder” occupations.
The process by which promotions are requested and accepted is a simplifying generalization
of the many contexts in which wage climbing occurs in reality. Real-world examples might
include employees submitting applications to be considered for higher-paying roles, speaking
with bosses about taking on greater responsibility and being compensated accordingly,
renegotiation of salary, or simply working harder to signal high marginal productivity in
the hope of a raise.
There are both male and female workers, about whom some simplifiying assumptions are
made. No worker is ever fired. Moreover, in the baseline model, a worker in a particular
occupation may not switch except after having given birth to a child. Hence male workers
commit to an industry at the beginning of their lives, and never switch.
For the first m < n periods, the worker’s utility in each period is given by his or her
current wage, w. In period m (denoting “marriage” or “match”), the worker is exogenously
partnered with a member of the opposite gender. At this time, the couple draws a random
non-pecuniary benefit to having a child given by B ∼ U [w, w + ∆]. If the couple decides to
have a child, they will enjoy this benefit each period after the child’s birth for the remainder
of their lives. Both members of the household now face the same period utility function,
given as the sum of household income plus the benefit to having a child:
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U (wM , wW , B) = wM + wW + 1(child born)B

(2.2.2)

Wages are subscripted by man and woman. Assume for simplicity the couple can have at
most one child, who can be born in period m only if the couple chooses. For a child to be
born, the woman must exit the workforce for a < n − m periods of birthing and childcare,
after which she may reenter the workforce in period m + a + 1, once again choosing an
occupation to enter at the minimum wage. Mandatory time out of the work force after
a birth is a reasonable aspect of the model as suggested by Figure 7, which shows the
cumulative percents of women working by number of months after a first birth, by time
cohort.
Requiring the woman to reenter the workforce at a lower (minimum) wage after exiting
is a simplification based in reality. One might ask whether a child’s consumption would
actually require the woman to work harder and thereby have the opposite effect. Much
empirical work has been done comparing women’s wages before and after maternity; see
Waldfogel (1997) for one of the most cited examples. The fact that mothers tend to
enter an occupation on lower ranks than non-mothers is established by Kunze (2014) using
Norwegian panel data. This research also finds mothers to be 1.6 percentage points less
likely to receive promotions than non-mothers (the “family gap”). Using register data on
West Germany, Ejrnæs and Kunze (2011) find that on reentering the workforce after giving
birth, mothers experience a decrease in wages of 3-5.7% per year of maternity leave, and a
negative selection back to full-time employment. Regardless, the current paper obtains the
same essential qualitative results whether or not mothers are allowed to return to previous
wage levels after birth. Additionally, the mother’s need to worker harder after a child is
born can be offset, in the case of married couples, by the empirically observed rise in male
wages after fatherhood; see Hodges and Budig (2010).
The goal is now to solve for optimal behavior by both men and women, and compare the
average or expected per-period income among all working individuals who are behaving
optimally. Such a comparison must only examine working individuals and normalize away
the possible a periods of maternity time. The result is that women’s normalized income is
lower than men’s when both genders behave optimally, suggesting a component of income
inequality arising from natural biological differences, unrelated to employment discrimination.
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2.3. Solution to Baseline Model
In the following section, optimal behavior is determined for the man and woman with respect
to the baseline model. First, a framework is established for solving the man’s problem. The
framework is then extended in the more complex woman’s problem. Expected lifetime
incomes for the man and woman are calculated. A normalized income statistic, “average
income per period worked,” is found for both genders.
2.3.1. Optimality for Man
In the first period of the man’s life, he chooses an occupation. In periods t = 1...n − 1, he
must choose a raise εt to request. The decision to have a child can be viewed as exogenous
to the man, since he can take no action in birthing the child; any birthing action will be
taken by his spouse, whose utility perfectly aligns with his own. Each receives the same
non-pecuniary benefit B, and the remaining utility is given by the sum of the household’s
wages. Thus the man’s only concern is to maximize his discounted lifetime income.
The man’s strategy can be expressed as (φM , {Ωt }n−1
t=1 ) where φM ∈ [0, 1] is his occupational
choice at the start of life, and Ωt : [w, w +t−1)×[0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is a mapping from all possible
current wages and occupations at time t to a wage request εt ().
To solve for the optimal strategy, we first seek to establish an occupation-specific value
function for the man, VM (t, w, φ), where t, w, and φ are his current period, wage, and
occupation. This value function should be interpreted as the value to the man derived
exclusively from working in that occupation, not accounting for additional benefits received
via his wife’s income, or from having a child. We know his value in the final period of life:

VM (n, w, φ) = w

(2.3.1)

In general, his value function is given by:

VM (t, w, φ) = max {w + β(p(w, ε, φ)VM (t + 1, w + ε, φ) + (1 − p(w, ε, φ))VM (t + 1, w, φ))}
0≤ε≤1

(2.3.2)

We proceed by backward induction. Using substitution to find his value in period n − 1,
and by plugging in the raise probabilities, we see that VM (n − 1, w, φ) =
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max {w + β((1 − ε) 2 (1 −

0≤ε≤1

(1−φ)

1+e

1

1

(−w+µ)
σ

)(w + ε) + (1 − (1 − ε) 2 (1 −

(1−φ)

1+e

(−w+µ)
σ

))w}

(2.3.3)

Taking the FOC with respect to ε, we get an interior solution of ε∗n−1 = 23 , independent of
the occupation or current wage. Plugging this number back into 2.3.3, we get
√
β2 3
1
VM (n − 1, w, φ) = w(1 + β) +
(1 −
)
(−w+µ)
9
1 + e(1−φ) σ

(2.3.4)

To determine ε∗n−2 (), we plug expression 2.3.4 into 2.3.2 and once again take the FOC with
respect to ε. The process iterates in this manner.
By numerically approximating the solution, it is found that ε∗t ≈

2
3

for t = 1...n − 2; in every

period of the man’s life, the optimal raise request is approximately

2
3

with a high degree

of precision, regardless of the occupation or current wage. For a high computation speed
approximation to the value function that is still quite accurate, it is possible to construct
the value function at time t < n that treats the raise request as exogenous:

VM (t, w, φ) = w + β(p(w, 32 , φ)VM (t + 1, w + 23 , φ) + (1 − p(w, 32 , φ))VM (t + 1, w, φ)) (2.3.5)

Nonetheless, 2.3.2 should be used for greatest accuracy. All explicit values can now be found
by backward induction from 2.3.1. We now know the man’s (and later, by the same logic,
the woman’s) optimal raise request paths within an occupation. Finally, the man chooses
an occupation at the beginning of his life by solving:

φ∗M = arg max VM (1, w, φ)
0≤φ≤1
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(2.3.6)

2.3.2. Man’s Lifetime Expected Income
The man’s undiscounted expected lifetime income can be approximated to a high degree of
accuracy in two ways (undiscounted because here we are interested in quantity, not utility
value.) The first is to Monte Carlo simulate a large number of lifetime wage paths under
the man’s optimal strategy. The second is to take advantage of the fact that ε∗t ≈

2
3

for

t = 1...n − 2, for all w ∈ [w, w + t − 1], and for all φ ∈ [0, 1], and solve for the lifetime
expected income analytically using value functions that treat ε∗t as exogenous.
The second method is implemented as follows. Since the man will always request a raise
of 23 , starting at time 1 by entering an occupation at wage w, he proceeds to stochastically
~ where the elements of X
~ comprise the set of
climb a ladder of possible wages {w + 2 X},
3

~ = 0, 1, ...n − 1.
“wage rungs” or “number of promotions received.” These elements are X
~ be a variable describing the number of promotions received. Since the male
Let j ∈ X
worker has chosen his optimal occupation at time 1, each jump occurs with probability
p(w, 23 , φ∗M ). For example, if he always receives the raise, an event which happens with
n−1
Q
probability
p(w + 23 j, 32 , φ∗M ), his wage in the last period of life will be w + 23 (n − 1). To
j=0

find the man’s lifetime expected income at φ∗M , we require a probability-weighted sum of all
possible income paths along this “wage ladder”. This expression is difficult to simplify, since
at each rung the probability of the next raise changes, even if the requested increments are
the same. We can condense an expression for the man’s lifetime expected wages as follows:

n
X

E(


wt ) = nw +



1 2 ... n

t=1



p11

... p1n



 ~T

)
 ... ... ...  ( 23 X
pn1 ... pnn

(2.3.7)

In the n-by-n matrix above, which we will call P, element pij is the probability of spending
exactly i periods of one’s life working at wage rung j. The vector to the left of P scales by
~ T . We can expand pij as follows:
the number of periods worked at the wages 32 X

pij = p(earn wage j for exactly i periods) =
n−i+1
X
k=j+1

p(wage j first attained in k) p(stay j for i periods)
|
{z
}|
{z
}
denote qjk

p(leave j
| {z }

)1(k<n−i+1)

= (1 − p(w + 23 j, 23 , φ∗M ))i = p(w + 23 j, 23 , φ∗M )

(2.3.8)
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The lower bound on the sum in 2.3.8 is the first period at which wage level j could possibly
be reached. (Do not be confused by the indexing; wage rung j = 0 implies zero promotions
have been received, which is by construction possible at time period j + 1 = 1.) The upper
bound is the last period at which a worker can enter rung j and remain there for i periods
without dying first. An indicator function is placed as an exponent on p(leave j) because
if a worker enters rung j in period k = n − i + 1 and remains there for i total periods, he
has reached the end of his life and cannot “leave”.
There are

k−1
j



possible paths of getting to (k, j) while climbing the wage ladder. qjk is

calculated by taking the probability-weighted sum of all paths to (k − 1, j − 1), and then
multiplying by the probability of making an immediate wage jump, p(w+ 23 (j−1), 23 , φ∗M ). qjk
is trivially equal to 1 at (j = 0, k = 1), and trivially 0 for the impossible cases (j = 0, k > 1)
and j > k. After incorporating these probability-weighted path sums into equation 2.3.8
and filling in our matrix P, 2.3.7 gives us a man’s lifetime expected earnings.
A statistic later useful in comparing income streams across gender is “average earnings per
lifetime income
period worked,” or E( working
periods ). For men, denote this statistic by IM and calculate by

dividing 2.3.7 by n, since the number of periods worked by the man is constant at n.
2.3.3. Optimality for Woman
The woman’s problem has an added complexity: She can give birth to a child in period
m. She does not know at the beginning of her life how much she will want a child, since
the non-pecuniary benefit is drawn in period m. The possibility of wanting a child may
affect her career choice pre-maternity; the act of having a child may affect her career choice
post-maternity. Moreover, the act of giving birth affects her ability to work for a periods.
The woman’s strategy can be expressed as (φW,1 , {Ωt }n−1
t=1 , M, φW,2 ). Here φW,1 ∈ [0, 1] is
her occupational choice at the start of life. Ωt : [w, w + t − 1) × [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] maps all
possible current wages and occupations at time t to a wage request εt (). M is a maternity
decision mapping from [w, w + ∆] × [0, 1] × [w, w + m − 1] 7→ {child, no child}; that is,
from all possible benefits to having a child, occupations, and current wages to a discrete
motherhood choice. Finally, φW,2 ∈ [0, 1] is her post-maternity occupational choice.
Once again, we solve by backward induction. Suppose a woman gave birth to a child in
period m and has just completed the a periods of maternity. The period is m + a + 1. She
will choose to enter an occupation by maximizing a value function analogous to the man’s:
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φ∗W,2 = arg max VW (m + a + 1, w, φ)

(2.3.9)

0≤φ≤1

A subscript of 2 was placed on φ∗W to denote the post-maternity occupation choice, as
opposed to a subscript of 1 which will later denote the pre-maternity occupation choice
made at time 1. (Once again, the woman will ask for raises εt () close to

2
3

in all states.)

In period m once B is realized, the discounted lifetime benefit to having a child is given by
the sum of a geometric series:
n
X

β i−m B = B

i=m+1

β − β n−m+1
1−β

(2.3.10)

We can then calculate the lifetime discounted utility for a woman who births a child at time
m, knowing her child value B, and who resumes work in period m + a + 1. This is given
by the LHS of equation 2.3.11. Given state (m, w, φ) and a realized benefit B, the woman
will choose to birth a child if and only if

β a+1 VW (m + a + 1, w, φ∗W,2 ) + B

β − β n−m+1
≥ VW (m, w, φ) − w
1−β

(2.3.11)

The RHS of the equation is the present value to remaining employed in the current occupation. Rearranging 2.3.11, the maternity condition can be rewritten

B≥(

1−β
)[VW (m, w, φ) − w − β a+1 VW (m + a + 1, w, φ∗W,2 )] ≡ B(m, w, φ; β, a)
β − β n−m+1
(2.3.12)

Given some wage and occupation state in period m, B() is the minimum non-pecuniary
benefit the woman must receive to become a mother; using the uniform distribution of B,
the probability of becoming a mother before seeing B, having just entered state (m, w, φ),
is therefore
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w + ∆ − B(m, w, φ; β, a)


,


∆
p(B ≥ B(m, w, φ; β, a)) = 0,




1,

B ∈ [w, w + ∆]
B >w+∆

(2.3.13)

B<w

The value to a woman at state (m, w, φ) with a realized B is the maximum of the two sides
of 2.3.11. Let V̂W (t, w, φ) denote the value to the woman before B is realized. We can write
V̂W in period m as follows:

V̂W (m, w, φ) = w + E max{β a+1 VW (m + a + 1, w, φ∗W,2 ) + B

β − β n−m+1
, VW (m, w, φ) − w}
1−β

= w + p(B ≥ B(m, w, φ; β, a))(β a+1 VW (m + a + 1, w, φ∗W,2 )
+(

β − β n−m+1
)E(B|B > B(m, w, φ; β, a)))
1−β
+ (1 − p(B ≥ B(m, w, φ; β, a)))(VW (m, w, φ) − w) (2.3.14)

The woman’s optimal pre-maternity wage-climbing strategy and career choice are solved
using backward induction from V̂W (m, w, φ) in the spirit of 2.3.5. With an expression for
the value function in the first period, we can finally solve for the woman’s initial occupation
choice in a fashion analogous to 2.3.6:

φ∗W,1 = arg max V̂W (1, w, φ)

(2.3.15)

0≤φ≤1

We have now solved for the woman’s optimal strategy, which includes an initial occupation
choice, a raise-request for each period of her working life, a maternity decision in state m
after the realization of B, and a post-maternity occupation choice.
A natural question to ask is, if the a periods away from the labor force encompass both
birthing and childcare, why can’t parents share responsibility for the latter aspect? Why
must the entirety of the a periods be spent by the female? The model can be viewed
in a way that eliminates this restriction but induces the same behavior. Suppose a were
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composed of two sequential components: giving birth, followed by early childcare. The
woman must leave the workforce to birth a child. Now the family must decide whether the
mother will continue at home for the remainder of a, or whether the father and mother will
swap places. Since a mother has already paid the wage costs associated with motherhood,
the family finds it optimal for her to continue at home; it would be inefficient for the man
to take over for her, as his wages would then suffer, too. Hence the mother will always
choose her first occupation keeping in mind the possibility of spending a whole periods out
of the workforce as a mother, and the man will choose his first occupation anticipating no
time out of the workforce.
2.3.4. Woman’s Lifetime Expected Income
Here again, the expected lifetime income can be approximated with a high degree of accuracy
in two ways. The first is by Monte Carlo simulating a large number of wage growth paths
according to the woman’s optimal strategy. The second is by assuming ε ≈

2
3

in all states

and solving analytically, as follows.
~ of length m, whose ith component is w + 2 (i − 1) for i = 1...m,
Let there be a vector Y
3
describing the set of possible wages in period m. Wages are subscripted by time period. The
woman’s lifetime expected income is the following probability-weighted sum of all possible
income paths:

E(

n
X
t=1

wt ) = E(

m
X

wt |w1 = w, φ = φ∗W,1 ) +

t=1

m−1
X

p(wm = Yi )[...

i=1

p(B ≥ B(m, wi , φ∗W,1 ))E(

n
X

wt |wm+a = w, φ = φ∗W,2 )+

t=m+a

(1 − p(B ≥

n
X
∗
wt |wm
B(m, wi , φW,1 f )))E(
t=m+1

= wi , φ = φ∗W,1 ))] (2.3.16)

The maternity probability is given by 2.3.13, while the expected wage sums are calculated
in a fashion analogous to the process used in 2.3.7.
Since the woman sometimes spends a periods out of occupation, it is necessary to use
lifetime income
a normalized statistic for comparing income across genders. Let us use E( working
periods ).

Since the man spends every period working, the denominator for him is constant, and thus
his normalized “expected period income” was simply his lifetime expected income divided
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by n. For the woman, the expression is more complicated. Begin by calculating the ex ante
(period 1) probability of giving birth as:

p(motherhood) =

m−1
X

p(wm = Yi )p(B ≥ B(m, wi , φ∗W,1 ))

(2.3.17)

i=1

Remaining lifetime expected income after motherhood, denoted I2child , is given by:
n
X

I2child = E(

wt |wm+a+1 = w, φ = φ∗W,2 )

(2.3.18)

t=m+a+1

The ex ante (viewed from period 1) expected total income earned after m and after the
decision not to have a child is denoted I2no child and given by

I2no child

=

m−1
X

p(wm = Yi )E(

n
X

wt |wm = wi , φ = φ∗W,1 )

(2.3.19)

t=m+1

i=1

Expected total income from periods 1...m is denoted I1 and given by

I1 = E(

m
X

wt |w1 = w, φ = φ∗W,1 )

(2.3.20)

t=1

lifetime income
Finally, we can compute the woman’s normalized income, E( working
periods ), denoted by IW :


IW = p(motherhood)

I1 + I2child
n−a




+ (1 − p(motherhood))

I1 + I2no child
n


(2.3.21)

We are now ready to compare the normalized incomes of women and men for any set of
parameters (n, m, a, β, µ, σ, w, ∆).

2.4. Baseline Numerical Analysis
A numerical analysis was performed using the following baseline parameter values:
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The fact that ε∗ ≈

2
3

Parameter

Value

Parameter

Value

β

0.99

µ

3

n

45

σ

2

m

15

∆

5

a

5

w

0

in all states (regardless of the current period, wage, or occupation)

was numerically verified using backward iteration from period n.
It is helpful to see how φ affects a worker’s ability to stochastically wage climb. Figure 8
shows the evolution of the probability of receiving a promotion of ε∗ in two occupations,
with high and low φ. The high-φ occupation exhibits relatively slow advancement at the
beginning, but offers more room to grow. For example, we could compare the wage evolution of an investment banker (high φ) who begins as an analyst with low wages but who
eventually makes vice president, versus a restaurant employee (low φ) who quickly becomes
manager, but who sees little opportunity for advancement beyond his managerial wage.
VM (t, w, φ) was solved using backward iteration as described in Section 2.3.1. φ∗M was
calculated by finding the argmax over VM (1, w, φ) with respect to φ. Figure 9 shows how
the man’s period-one value peaks at φ∗M = 0.569. The intuition is that the man considers any
occupation φ > 0.569 to be too difficult to climb during his finite lifespan. An occupation
with φ < .569 does not show enough potential for long-term advancement.
The woman’s optimal occupation strategies were solved by similar means of backward induction with numerical maximization, with a result that φ∗W,2 = 0 and φ∗W,1 = 0.318.
The longer a worker knows he/she will be committed to working, i.e., the longer the lifespan,
the more the worker will value long-term career advancement. Figure 10 demonstrates
this effect, showing that higher n implies a higher optimal occupation choice, φ∗ . This
result also explains the inequality φ∗W,2 < φ∗M : When a woman reenters the workforce after
motherhood, her remaining number of working periods is n − m − a < n, and thus she favors
an occupation with the opportunity for more rapid advancement.
There is also intuition for the fact φ∗W,1 < φ∗M . In period m, if the woman does not become
a mother, in retrospect she would like to have chosen the same occupation as the man,
since φ∗M is the optimal occupation choice for someone knowing she will work for n straight
periods. But if she does become a mother, since she is now exiting the workforce for a
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time, she would like to have chosen an occupation she had been able to climb relatively
rapidly. So the woman faces a tradeoff, owing to the fact that at time 1, she does not yet
know whether she will later choose motherhood. It is the potential for motherhood in this
tradeoff that induces φ∗W,1 < φ∗M .
Due to the possibility of motherhood, women optimally choose lower ladder occupations.
This drives the fact that the woman’s normalized average per-period income (expectation
of total income over periods worked) is smaller than the man’s. These normalized incomes
were Monte Carlo estimated with trial sizes of 50, 000. Random wage-promotion paths
for the man were stochastically drawn following his occupation decision, according to the
evolution of his promotion probabilities. A similar process was followed for the woman, with
an additional random draw B in period m and an optimal decision regarding motherhood.
The woman’s normalized earnings were found to be 3.014, or 29.03% less than the man’s,
which were 4.247.
A woman’s initial occupational choice, and hence her expected earnings, are a function of ∆,
which sets an upper bound on the non-pecuniary benefit to motherhood. As ∆ approaches
0, the woman’s optimal initial occupation choice approaches the man’s, and her earnings
approach the man’s; this is because she approaches the certainty of having no child. As ∆
grows, so does the probability of having a child, and hence her φ∗W,1 approaches zero, and
her earnings approach a lower bound less than the man’s. These relationships are captured
in Figures 11 and 12, the latter having been smoothed with a moving average filter. The
irregularities in the first plot arise from a high variance Monte Carlo simulation, using
3, 000 trials per data point. The result here is consistent with the fact that non-mothers
earn higher wages and select into occupations associated with higher prestige; women with
lower values of ∆ know they are less likely to become mothers.
Figure 13 plots comparative statics for a, showing how the woman’s normalized earnings
change as the number of mandatory periods out of the work force changes. The result is
that an increase in a leads to an increase in the female’s income. Why? As a increases,
the opportunity cost to having a child increases, making it less likely the woman will give
birth; this incents the woman to choose a higher-ladder industry at the start of life, which
raises her normalized average income.

2.5. Extended Model with Childcare
The model is now extended to include a day care services option. In period m, the woman
is no longer obligated to exit the workforce for a periods. Her family has the alternative
of paying a day care cost c for each of the a periods, so she can remain in her current
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occupation without wage demotion and continue to climb her wage ladder. During that
time, a mother opting for day care services receives non-pecuniary benefit γB to having a
child, where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a utility-reducing factor due to time away from the child. (The
father can experience this, too, but the problem remains unchanged.)
2.5.1. Optimality for Man
The man’s problem remains unchanged. He chooses an occupation at the beginning of life
according to 2.3.6, and his strategy encompasses a raise request choice for all possible states
of time, occupation, and current wage.
2.5.2. Optimality for Woman
We begin solving the woman’s problem by considering her decision at time m, after she and
her husband have jointly drawn B. The woman now has three options: (1) Do not birth a
child. (2) Birth a child, and exit the workforce for a periods to care for the child. (3) Birth
a child, and hire a day care service for a periods while remaining in the workforce.
Suppose in period m the woman’s current wage and occupation are (w, φ1 ). The current
value of choosing the first option is V1 = VW (m, w, φ1 ) − w, where the value function is the
same as before. The current value of choosing the second option is determined in the same
manner as in section 2.3.3, and equals:

V2 = β a+1 VW (m + a + 1, w, φ∗W,2 ) + B

β − β n−m+1
1−β

(2.5.1)

The value to choosing the third option is:

V3 = VW (m, w, φ1 ) − w + (γB − c)

β a+1 − β n−m+1
β − β a+1
+B
1−β
1−β

(2.5.2)

The woman’s choice in period m is determined by max{V1 , V2 , V3 } as derived in Appendix
2.B. The woman’s optimal pre-maternity wage-climbing strategy and career choice are
solved using backward induction from V̂W (m, w, φ) in the spirit of 2.3.5. With an expression
for the value function in the first period, we solve for the woman’s initial occupation choice
in a fashion analogous to 2.3.6:

φ∗W,1 = arg max V̂W (1, w, φ)
0≤φ≤1
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(2.5.3)

We have now solved for the woman’s optimal strategy in a model permitting families to
opt for day care services. The strategy includes an initial occupation choice, a raise-request
for each period of her working life, a maternity and day care decision in state m after the
realization of B, and a post-maternity occupational choice.

2.6. Analysis of Extended Childcare Model
The natural question to ask is how the woman’s normalized expected income behaves in
relation to the cost of day care. Figure 14 plots this relationship using Monte Carlo draws
to compute the expected income at each data point, and Figure 15 shows the smoothed
values after a moving average filter is applied. Income levels fall in c, approaching a lower
bound on the right. As the cost of day care is reduced, the woman’s income level rises
toward that of the man’s.
When the woman knows c to be low, day care is more attractive for her relative to dropping
out of the workforce. The opportunity cost to having a child becomes lower as the day
care option becomes more attractive. Hence at the start of life, the woman believes herself
more likely to remain in the workforce continuously, and so she chooses a higher ladder
occupation. By contrast, when c is high, day care is a less attractive option relative to
dropping out of the workforce during the a required periods. At the start of life, the woman
believes herself less likely to work for n periods straight, and so her optimal first-period
occupation choice is of a lower ladder.
It is via this mechanism that a relationship between the regulation of day care markets
and the gender income gap is proposed in theory. The empirical work of Heeb and Kilburn
(2004), Powell (2002), Michalopoulos and Robins (2000), Kimmel (1998), and Ribar
(1992) establishes the positive effect of state regulations on prices of day care services, as
well as a negative effect on childcare services demand and labor participation rates among
women. Additionally, Kabátek (2014) develops a structural model of labor supply, fertility,
and childcare of Dutch women using administrative panel data spanning 2001-2009, finding
a positive change in the maternal labor supply induced by childcare subsidies. Consistent
with the data, the current model finds a negative relationship between day care costs and
female labor participation, and explains an additional relationship between day care costs
and gender income differentials.

2.7. Conclusion
This paper proposes a theory for explaining the persistent “unexplained” component of
the gender wage gap. The theory is consistent with the empirical literature relating regulations of the childcare industry to higher prices and reduced female labor participation.
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It furthermore establishes a relationship between such regulations and this “unexplained”
component of the gender wage gap. The theory’s central workhorse is a model of optimal
occupational choice for men and women, involving the ability to stochastically wage climb.
Men and women have aligned preferences and seek to maximize the discounted lifetime
income stream of the household plus a randomly drawn non-pecuniary benefit to having a
child.
Numerical results find that increasing the expected benefit to having a child, and hence
the likelihood of maternity, induces women to optimally choose lower ladder industries
in expectation of exiting the workforce. Chosing occupations with reduced wage growth
potentials causes women to earn less per working period on average, hence an amplification
of the gender wage differential. As the probability of maternity—as predicted upon entering
the workforce—approaches zero, women choose higher ladder occupations, and the gender
wage gap narrows.
The gender wage gap can be mitigated with the introduction of childcare services. Depending on the price of such services, women may opt to remain in the workforce after
giving birth. In anticipation of this option, a woman entering the workforce at the start
of life puts a new weight on the probability of working continuously, and so her optimal
occupational choice differs. The lower the cost of childcare services, the more likely the
woman will remain in the labor force post motherhood, and hence the higher the ladder of
her chosen industry. As the woman choses a higher ladder at the start of life, the gender
income differential is reduced.
2.7.1. Possible Extensions to Model
Future researchers may wish to consider extend the model with the purpose of exploring
new uses or more closely approximating reality. The following considerations can be made.
(1) Letting the woman decide to give birth to her child in any period ≥ m adds interesting
complexities to the initial occupational choice. (2) Figures 10 and 8 suggest that workers’
occupational preferences change over time. For example, an unlucky worker who has received few promotions after many working periods may wish to switch to a lower ladder job
mid-life, thereby taking better advantage of his remaining income-generating periods. A
more dynamic model should be considered wherein workers may switch occupations at any
time. (3) A simple tweak that should be considered: Allow women to reenter the workforce,
post motherhood, at an income level between minimum wage and the former wage before
childbirth. (4) The characteristic that women draw B in period m, and before m have no
idea how much they will value a child, can also be adjusted for greater realism and interest.
More likely, women decide at different ages whether they will want a child in the future,
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and this preference can evolve. A modified model can be considered wherein females receive
noisy signals as to their true B, in periods leading to m—and during this process, they are
also allowed to switch occupations. We would expect to observe women with high true B’s
converging toward lower ladder occupations, and vice versa. A simpler variation of this
modification would entail considering an economy of m − 1 types of females, where a female
of type m realizes B in period m; all other aspects of the model would remain unchanged,
but now the normalized earnings of females would have to be considered in aggregate.
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Appendix 2.A.
Plots

Figure 5: Persistence of the unexplained gender wage differential.

Figure 6: Education levels of mothers and non-mothers, 2006-2008, adapted from Livingston
and Cohn (2010).
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Figure 7: Cumulative percents of women working after first birth, by time cohort.

Figure 8: Comparison of wage-climbing opportunity in two occupations. y-axis shows
probability that a raise of ε∗ = 23 is accepted.
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Figure 9: Period-one value to man by occupation, showing optimal φ∗M choice.

Figure 10: Man’s optimal occupation choice varied along lifespans.
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Figure 11: Woman’s normalized earnings as Monte Carlo draws, versus ∆.

Figure 12: Woman’s normalized earnings varying with ∆, smoothed.
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Figure 13: Woman’s normalized earnings varying with a, for high ∆.

Figure 14: Woman’s normalized earnings as Monte Carlo draws, varying with c.
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Figure 15: Woman’s normalized earnings as MC draws varying with c, smoothed.
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Appendix 2.B.
Derivation of Optimal Maternity/Daycare Choice
The woman’s maternity and day care choice is determined by max{V1 , V2 , V3 }, where:

V1 = VW (m, w, φ1 ) − w

V2 = β a+1 VW (m + a + 1, w, φ∗W,2 ) + B

V3 = VW (m, w, φ1 ) − w + (γB − c)

(2.B.1)

β − β n−m+1
1−β

β a+1 − β n−m+1
β − β a+1
+B
1−β
1−β

(2.B.2)

(2.B.3)

These are the respective values in period m to choosing (1) no child, (2) a child and no day
care service, or (3) a child and a day care service. For simplicity while solving, constants
are grouped so the expressions can be rewritten:

V1 = J

V2 = K + BL

V3 = J + (γB − c)M + BN

The expected value of the maximum in period m, before drawing B ∼ U [w, w + ∆], is:
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E(max{V1 , V2 , V3 }) = p(V1 > max{V2 , V3 })E(V1 |V1 > max{V2 , V3 })
+ p(V2 > max{V1 , V3 })E(V2 |V2 > max{V1 , V3 })
+ p(V3 > max{V1 , V2 })E(V3 |V3 > max{V1 , V2 }) (2.B.4)

The first term is derived as follows:

p(V1 > V2 ) = p(B <

p(V1 > V3 ) = p(B <

⇒ p(V1 > max{V2 , V 3} = p(B < min{
=

J −K
)
L

cM
)
N + γM

J −K
cM
,
})
L
N + γM
cM
max{min{ J−K
L , N +γM , w + ∆}, w} − w
∆

(2.B.5)

Composed solely of constants, E(V1 |V1 > max{V2 , V3 }) is trivially equal to J. The second
term is derived as follows:

p(V2 > V1 ) = p(B >
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J −K
)
L

p(V2 > V3 ) = p(B <

K + cM − J
)
N + γM − L

J −K
K + cM − J
<B<
)
L
N + γM − L
J−K
K+cM −J
max{min{ N
+γM −L , w + ∆}, w} − min{max{ L , w}, w + ∆}

⇒ p(V2 > max{V1 , V 3}) = p(
=

∆

(2.B.6)

and

E(V2 |V2 > max{V1 , V3 }) = K + LE(B|V2 > max{V1 , V3 })

(2.B.7)

where

E(B|V2 > max{V1 , V3 }) =

K+cM −J
J−K
max{min{ N
+γM −L , w + ∆}, w} + min{max{ L , w}, w + ∆}

2

The third term is derived as follows:

p(V3 > V1 ) = p(B >

p(V3 > V2 ) = p(B >
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cM
)
N + γM

K + cM − J
)
N + γM − L

cM
K + cM − J
,
})
N + γM N + γM − L
cM
K+cM −J
w + ∆ − min{max{ N +γM
,N
+γM −L , w}, w + ∆}

⇒ p(V3 > max{V1 , V 2} = p(B > max{
=

∆

(2.B.8)

and

E(V3 |V3 > max{V1 , V2 })
= J + (γE(B|V3 > max{V2 , V3 }) − c)M + E(B|V3 > max{V2 , V3 })N

(2.B.9)

where

E(B|V3 > max{V2 , V3 }) =

cM
K+cM −J
w + ∆ + min{max{ N +γM
,N
+γM −L , w}, w + ∆}

2

Subsituting the terms into 2.B.4 yields the mother’s expected maximum value of the three
choices before the benefit to having a child is known.
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CHAPTER 3 : The Talent-Tax Trade-off in Locational Decisions of Television
Productions
Abstract. The past decade has seen a flight from Hollywood television production
despite the comparative advantages Los Angeles has developed for over a century. We
theoretically examine the location choice and endogenous growth dynamics of television
productions facing labor supplies that are heterogeneous in skill level. The location
choice is influenced by tax considerations, as well as the regional accessibility of talent.
An endogenously dynamic Cobb-Douglas production function is developed to capture
changing productivities of inputs over the life cycle of a TV production. Equilibrium is
found numerically. The model is used to explain why studios and producers have begun
shifting television production outside of Hollywood despite the high concentration of
production talent in Los Angeles.

3.1. Introduction
The location choice of firms is a popular subject of economic research. Why does the United
States have regional hotbeds of entrepreneurial activity? The upper East Coast attracts
biotech companies; Silicon Valley has long been popular for internet and information technology startups; Colorado is becoming competitive in its ability to attract young, vibrant
entrepreneurs seeking startup capital; and Virginia, Florida, and Texas are competing to
accomplish the same, as documented by the Startup America Partnership and Small Business Administration. Determining how and why up-and-coming entrepreneurial economies
can become hotbeds of innovation—or lose their attractiveness over time—is a question of
significant interest.
The same questions apply in the context of the entrepreneurial entertainment industry,
where every production is operated like an independent business with a set of products that
may extend beyond the production itself to include merchandising, books, spinoff series,
games, etc. Movie “ventures” are even formed as individual LLCs. Every film or television
series can be regarded as a unique enterprise facing its own locational decisions. In fact,
the development of Los Angeles as the major film/TV hub can be attributed to locational
incentives dating back to the early 1900s, when filmmakers moved west to avoid lawsuits by
Thomas Edison’s Motion Picture Patents Company in New Jersey; Edison’s company, which
owned most motion picture patents, had been aggressively suing filmmakers and putting a
halt to productions. As a result, and owing in part to the wide variety of sets/geographies
available in California, Hollywood became the capital of the film and television industries
and has since maintained its status as the premiere nexus for production.
Coauthor : Ross Askanazi
Key words and phrases. Heterogeneous labor, growth
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Nonetheless, production in the past few years has seen a flight from Hollywood. Producers
have reduced costs by locating in production-friendly states, namely New York, North
Carolina, Louisiana, and Georgia. In 2012, fewer than 10% of the new fall and midseason
hour-long dramas were shot in Los Angeles County—dropped from 50% in 2010 and close
to 80% in 2005, as shown in Figure 16. A report by Klowden et al. (2014) at the Milken
Institute shows California lost 11% of its film/TV-related jobs from 2004 to 2012 (a total
of 16,137) while New York state gained 25% (a total of 10,675), following New York’s
expanded film and television tax credit program allocating $420 million annually to attract
film/television productions (four times that of California’s credit program). Figure 17
shows the relative change in absolute employment numbers; Table 4 contains data from
other leading states, as well. The entertainment jobs are also high paying, with an average
of nearly $98,500 per person, and linked with ancillary jobs including those at prop houses,
equipment rental houses, catering firms, etc.
The shift away from Los Angeles is made even more surprising by the fact that Hollywood
has had over a century to develop its comparative advantages. Entertainment talent—
including directors, writers, actors, crew, production assistants, cinematographers, editors,
sound/music-related talent, and other categories—is heavily concentrated in the Hollywood
area. Not only that, but there exists a well-developed infrastructure in Los Angeles to
assist in matching between talent and productions; agencies and management companies
like Creative Artists Agency and Anonymous Content make a business of connecting talent
with the right projects. This infrastructure is not as well-developed in other states, nor
do other states have complex infrastructures for set creation and other aspects of TV and
filmmaking.
The current paper addresses two conflicting broad categories of variables relevant to a
television venture’s location choice decision. The first is the availability of labor in the
area, coupled with the relative availability of talented (or “skilled”) and unskilled labor.
The second is the role government plays in the economy of the area: tax rates/credits,
ease of navigating bureaucratic snares, costs of obeying regulations. Qualitatively, the
relationship between these two variables is simple. A producer prefers a location with a
large pool of available labor in a favorable skilled/unskilled ratio, desires tax credits, and
objects to burdensome government intervention. Quantitatively, it is unclear to what extent
one aspect of the tradeoff can outweigh the other, or how the question can be approached
from a theoretical standpoint. In areas where skilled labor is so plentiful that it becomes
relatively inexpensive, does the government hold some semblance of market power, so that
it can charge high taxes and not see a flight of television productions to other regions? In
areas with scarce labor and scarce talent, can governments attract entertainment ventures
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by being friendly to production? We wish to develop a theory that will enable the study of
these and related questions.
Of further interest is the conjecture that these answers may depend on the age and development of a venture in a given region. This paper restricts the focus to television so that
this subject may also be studied. Movies have a “one-shot” structure: The movie is filmed,
produced, and then brought to market. Television has a continuing structure: When a
show is brought to market, if it performs well, further investment is made for continued
episodes/seasons. By investing more heavily in a certain television production, the producer (typically with the help of a major studio) can improve the quality and value of the
product: More labor-hours can go into filming/editing episodes, prominent cast members
can be hired, new locations can be afforded, and so on. This higher quality product can in
turn attract more viewers, increasing a network’s willingness to pay for more episodes and
making the show more profitable to the producer.
Young and long-standing television productions may face different location-based tradeoffs.
Young series have less labor-based attachment to their surroundings, but may also not
have the capital necessary to move even a small infrastructure. More developed shows may
find this transition more affordable, but have a more complex infrastructure and greater
attachment to their environment—settings, crew, etc. In light of this possibility, we find it
crucial to address locational decisions in the context of a TV series life cycle. Continuing
in this vein, there may be reflexivity between these variables. Government selection of
regional parameters may be influenced by life cycle patterns of TV productions, but the
life cycle patters of TV productions may themselves be a function of regional parameters.
Thus it is important to operate in the context of an endogenous firm life cycle. One of the
innovations developed in this paper is an endogenously dynamic Cobb-Douglas production
function that captures changing marginal productivities of skilled and unskilled labor over
the course of a production’s life cycle.
We approach this issue from multiple perspectives. As a foundation we begin with a basic
search and matching problem with heterogeneous TV productions and heterogeneous labor.
We extend this baseline model to include government and regional parameters that may exogenously vary between locations. This reveals the object of interest: the locationial choice
of TV productions. In what follows, Section 3.2 provides a literature review and motivation.
Section 3.3 presents the model that is used for quantitative analysis. Section 3.4 describes
the numerical method used to solve and analyze the baseline model. Section 3.5 presents
an alternative formulation that is more analytically tractable, but whose computational
difficulties necessitate the model of Section 3.3. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2. Literature Review
The areas of economics and mathematics that motivate this question and our approach span
multiple fields. We restrict our network theoretical toolkit by considering only two regions.
The economic tools and concepts we find useful are firm and worker heterogeneity (especially
the former), dynamic search and matching for firms, and regional location decisions for firms.
The following literature review discusses relevant research in firm theory in general; for our
purposes, television productions will assume the role of “firms” and operate as such.
The study of firm heterogeneity has a long and successful history. It is commonly accepted that firms are homogeneous in their preferences, unlike households; heterogeneity is
generally discussed in the context of productive capabilities. However, for much of early
labor/firm theory, decisions made by firms in the context of heterogeneity were taken to
be quite simple: Firms seek to profit maximize. The focus of the literature was on the
outcomes of labor and firm choices in the face of heterogeneity. For a good example of this,
see Hopenhayn (1992), which develops a dynamic model for determining entry, exit, and
growth of firms’ output and employment in a competitive industry. Stepping back further,
a complex theory of firm heterogeneity arguably began with Dixit and Stigitz (1977) in
their discussion of optimal product diversity. The history of this theory certainly extends
beyond these two works, but they provide a picture of the distinction between historical
and modern firm theory.
A starting point for modern theory of firm heterogeneity, though with a different application
than ours, is found in Melitz (2003) in which industry reallocation decisions are studied.
The key components of firm heterogeneity therein are differences in marginal productivity
of labor and in overall productivity, the latter being randomly drawn from a distribution.
Firms do not know what their productivity will be prior to the production phase. A similar
approach is taken in the first chapter of Melitz and Redding (2014). The key feature
distinguishing this work from Melitz (2003) is its focus on analyzing the decision problem
of firms who differ by productivity, and the dynamics that result from entry and exit.
Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011) introduce this new aspect of the theory into a
search setting. Our approach has parallels to that of Felbermayr et al., not surprisingly:
Embedding search frictions into a complicated decision problem for heterogeneous firms is
a young enough practice that a canonical approach is still useful for a variety of settings.
We distinguish our work from the results of Melitz and Felbermayr in two meaningful ways.
For one, we consider ex post heterogeneity rather than ex ante, as we are more interested in
the life cycle of firms than past work, and we seek to understand how firms make decisions
at different points in their lifetimes. Our theory begins with identical firms ex ante, and
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heterogeneity is introduced via the birth, growth, and death of firms and the outcomes of
their investments. This will also create a dynamic economy. Firms invest in their own
productivity, and thus grow (or die) as time passes. Our second distinct contribution is
the incorporation of a locational decision undertaken by firms ex ante. There exist multiple
locations where firms may choose to operate, and each location is parametrized by tax rates,
and an availability of skilled and unskilled labor. The location decision by firms, and the
incentives corresponding to such a choice, constitute the second primary focus of this paper.
Research in the area of regional location decisions has also proven fruitful. With multiple
regions, this problem can have deep mathematical and topological undertones; see Jackson
(2010). However, even in the case of deciding between two regions, the incentives and
dynamics that come into consideration are complex. Devereux et al.

(2007) explore

this problem from an industrial organization perspective, examining how agglomeration
of industries affects the choices for new entrants. Bhat, Paleti, and Singh (2014) address
this question from a purely empirical standpoint using sophisticated mathematical and
topological methods. The empirics used in their case are also motivated by elements of
industrial organization, and include the role that the government can play in manipulating
IO variables—anti-trust laws, discretionary grants to specific industries, etc.
A growing body of research continues to address location choice from a labor-oriented perspective. Modern work providing a foundation for study includes Moretti (2010), in which
a GE framework of regional labor markets is fitted with a spatial equilibrium. Building
from this work, Lutgen et al.

(2013) and many others develop models wherein homoge-

nous workers are faced with a regional location decision. Lutgen et al. help to empirically
motivate our approach, insofar as they find that matching effectiveness is a significant determinant of unemployment. This indicates that though location decisions at first pass may
seem to fall under the scope of industrial organization, search theory has something to teach
us about actual outcomes in the data. In particular, Lutgen et al. find that former notions
of efficiency no longer hold in regional settings; the Hosios condition is not sufficient to
ensure efficiency. Moreover, there are even cases in which increasing matching effectiveness
in a region increases unemployment rates. The intuition is that if increasing the matching
effectiveness has too strong of an effect in terms of attracting new workers, the total rate
of unemployment could still rise in response.
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3.3. Baseline Model
Terminology
Since the current model uses a firm theoretical toolkit in the context of television production,
for consistency with the economic literature, certain terms must be defined so the analogies
are clear in what follows. Television productions will sometimes be referred to as “TV firms”
or simply “firms”; these always refer to a single TV-series production and are not to be
confused with production houses as a whole. Workers of talent (directors, cinematographers,
etc.) will be called “skilled” and others are “unskilled.”
Television producers are paid by networks for the right to air or stream a show (and large
studios often provide capital for the production of a show). Since a network’s willingness to
pay increases with viewership, the popularity of a show drives its revenue-earning potential
for producers. A TV firm’s “productivity” in the context of this paper is not merely the
ability to create episodes, but the ability to earn high profits from networks.
A TV firm is considered to have a level of “technological investment” or a “productivity
technology” which governs its ability to earn profit from networks. In reality television
producers typically are not creating new technologies, but rather investing in the sum of
elements that create revenue-generating production value, including high-reputation actors,
film sets, equipment, etc. A TV firm’s productive technology/capability should be viewed
in this way, and the “technological frontier” should be viewed as the sum of elements that
create the highest possible production value.
Model
We consider an economy wherein a TV firm living in infinite discrete time begins its life by
choosing to permanently locate in one of two regions indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}. Each region has
a labor force comprised of skilled (type t) and unskilled (type l) workers; a worker’s skill
type s is contained in {t, l}. Each region has an infinite measure of immobile workers of each
type. Firms have measure unity. In a given period, a measure δ of firms is born, and each
existing firm dies with probability δ, ensuring a constant measure of firms in the economy.
(In the real-world analogy, the continuation or death of a TV production is determined by
networks, whose decision to renew or cancel a show is influenced by myriad unpredictable
factors.) Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, λ, which strictly increases in a firm’s
total level of technological investment, denoted by I, according to a logistic function with
parameters µ and σ:
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λ(I) =

1
1 + e−

I−µ
σ

A basic property of logistic functions implies λ(I) ∈ (0, 1). This s-shape of the logistic function is commonly used to describe the growth pattern of emerging technology, companies,
and whole industries. Figure 18 plots the proximity to the technological frontier as a function of total investment. Let t and l denote the number of respective skilled and unskilled
workers employed by a firm. Per period revenue, denoted by R, is given by a Cobb-Douglas
function whose dynamic exponents are governed by the current total internal investment
(technological capability). TV firms are taxed regionally at the marginal rate τj . Let the
technological frontier be given by a constant A, so as λ(I) increases, a firm’s coefficient on
revenue approaches the industry maximum. Revenue in a period is given by:

R(I, t, l, j) = λ(I)A(t + l)λ(I) t1−λ(I) (1 − τj )

A nascent or undeveloped production (with low I) strongly prefers skilled workers, whereas
a large, developed production (with high I) sees a smaller marginal benefit to hiring talent
and cares more about the size of the work force. The dynamic exponents on the CobbDouglas revenue function capture the notion that developed firms have a higher marginal
need for routinized or low-skill tasks (e.g., grips, assistants) relative to the marginal need
for high-skill tasks, than do less-developed firms who require powerhouse teams to establish
an early success. Nonetheless, even among highly developed and productive firms, a skilled
worker is always preferred to an unskilled one; this is captured by the inclusion of t in both
terms of the Cobb-Douglas revenue function. The parameters µ and σ determine the shape
of the company’s technological growth function, i.e., how quickly internal investment yields
higher productivity, and in turn how quickly the relative talent premium diminishes.
A TV firm enters a given period with a level of current investment, and a work force, given
by state variables (I, t, l). The firm then posts vacancies for skilled and unskilled work, vjt
and vjl , with marginal costs of posting equal to φt and φl . TV firms also simultaneously
invest some incremental amount i into their productivity-enhancing technology, with total
adjustment costs equal to ηi2 .
Workers and firms are matched according to an exogenous matching function m(Wjs , θjs ),
where Wjs is the current measure of workers of type s employed in region j, and θjs is
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a regional friction parameter specific to the labor type s. Search frictions imply that
m(Wjs , θjs ) ∈ (0, 1]. The higher the current level of employment, the more difficult it
is for a match to occur; the probability of a match approaches zero as the measure of
employment approaches infinity. The matching function used is:

m(Wjs , θjs ) = e−θjs Wjs

(3.3.1)

A smaller friction parameter θjs means skill of type s is more readily available; that is, for
a smaller fixed θjs , m(Wjs , θjs ) approaches zero in Wjs less quickly.
Workers receive an outside option b in unemployment insurance and/or benefits while unemployed. Let b be small enough to guarantee that workers always find job search profitable
while unemployed. Workers’ wages wjt and wjl are determined via a Nash bargaining process to be explained later.
The Firm’s Problem
The firm faces a dynamic optimization problem which we present here in recursive form.
Assume the firm discounts future value at rate r. A firm in region j with total investment
I, skilled labor t, and unskilled labor l has a value function given by:

V (I, t, l, j) = max [log(R(I, t, l, j)−wjt t−wjl l−φt vt −φl vl −ηi2 )+
vt ,vl ,i

1−δ
V (I 0 , t0 , l0 , j)] (3.3.2)
1+r

such that

R(I, t, l, j) ≥ wjt t + wjl l + φt vt + φl vl + ηi2

(3.3.3)

I0 = I + i

(3.3.4)

t0 = t + m(Wjt , θjt )

(3.3.5)

l0 = l + m(Wjl , θjl )

(3.3.6)

TV firms are born with some initial money, k, which they use in the first period of existence
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to invest and hire. At birth, firms choose a region according to:

j = arg max{max [log(k − φt vt − φl vl − ηi2 ) +
j∈{1,2}

vt ,vl ,i

1−δ
V (i, m(Wjt , θjt )vt , m(Wjt , θjl )vl , j)]}
1+r
(3.3.7)

where the inner objective function is subject to the budget constraint

k ≥ φt vt + φl vl + ηi2

(3.3.8)

Suppose in equilibrium that new TV firms are indifferent between regions 1 and 2, and mix
their geographical entry choice with probabilities (ω, 1 − ω). The size of next period’s labor
force, by type, is a deterministic function of the number of vacancies posted. All firms with
a given state (I, t, l) will have the same optimal behavior. After the economy has reached
an equilibrium steady state by existing for an infinite number of periods, the firms’ side of
the economy will consist of a sequence of generations n ∈ {1, 2, ...∞}, each of which has
measure (1−δ)n . There will be an optimal growth path in equilibrium given by the sequences
∞
({Inj , tnj , lnj }∞
n=1 )j∈{1,2} and corresponding vacancy postings ({vnjt , vnjl }n=1 )j∈{1,2} , which

can be used to calculate market frictions. The measure of employed workers of type s in
region j is given by:

Wjs = ω 1{j=1} (1 − ω)1{j=2} m(Wjs , θjs )

∞ X
n
X

vajs (1 − δ)n+1

(3.3.9)

n=1 a=1

Wage Determination
In the first period of life, firms Nash bargain with each skill type of workers using the
equation:

(1 − χ)[E(wjs ) − U (wjs )] = χ

dV (0, 0, 0, j)
ds0

(3.3.10)

Let us drop the regional and skill-type subscripts for a moment. Here χ denotes the relative
bargaining power between workers and TV firms. s0 is the measure of workers of type s
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being brought into the first revenue-generating period by newborn firms. E(w) and U (w)
are the respective benefits to being employed and unemployed in this economy where the
wage for the worker’s type is w; the former is given by:

E(w) = w +

1
[(1 − δ)E(w) + δU (w)]
1+r

(3.3.11)

Let the probability of an unemployed worker receiving a job offer equal the total measure of
new hires over the current measure of unemployed. Since the denominator in either region
is always infinite, this probability will be zero. Hence the value to being unemployed is
given by:

U (w) = b +

1
b(1 + r)
U (w) ⇒ U =
1+r
r

(3.3.12)

After nascent firms Nash bargain, they remain committed to hiring at those wages for the
remainder of life. In equilibrium, there will thus exist a single, constant pair of wages
(wjt , wjl ) in each region attained via Nash bargaining between workers and nascent firms.
By plugging equations 3.3.12 and 3.3.11 into 3.3.10, the wage determination equation attained is:

wjs = b +

r+δ
1+r



χ
1−χ



dV (0, 0, 0, j)
ds0

(3.3.13)

This amounts to a differential equation, since the value function V () is also a function
of wages; a numerical solution will later be computed. We now proceed to a notion of
equilibrium.
Definition 3.3.1. Competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of (A) regional growth
paths and hires by skill type, given by sequences ({Inj , tnj , lnj }∞
n=1 )j∈{1,2} , (B) corresponding vacancy postings ({vnjt , vnjl }∞
n=1 )j∈{1,2} , (C) wages {wjt , wjl }j∈{1,2} , (D) a mixing strategy (ω, 1 − ω) over regions 1 and 2 exercised by newborn TV firms, and (E) aggregate
employment levels {Wjt , Wjl }j∈{1,2} given by equation 3.3.9, such that:
(1) Newborn TV firms are indifferent between regions; the mixing strategy is optimal for
newborn firms.
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(2) Given wages and aggregate employment levels, a TV firm of generation n ≥ 2 chooses
{Inj , vnjt , vnjl } that maximize the objective function given by 3.3.2 subject to the budget
constraint in 3.3.3 and transition equations 3.3.4–3.3.6.
(3) Wages {wjt , wjl }j∈{1,2} are determined via Nash bargaining between nascent TV firms
and workers in each region as given by 3.3.13.
(4) Given aggregate employment levels and a region choice, newborn firms choose
{I1j , v1jt , v1jl }, and hence make a simultaneous choice of the endogenous wages in 3.3.13,
that together maximize their objective function given inside 3.3.7 subject to the budget
constraint in 3.3.8.

3.4. Numerical Method
A numerical equilibrium solution is found using standard value function iteration absorbed
under three further levels of iteration, each of which endogenizes another variable or variable
pair. The lowest level of iteration treats matching probabilities and wages as exogenous,
and solves for the optimal investment and vacancy choices by iteratively searching across a
three-dimensional discretized control space for each (I, t, l) state combination. We call this
basic VFI the “level 1” loop.
In a “level 2” algorithm, aggregate employment levels and matching probabilities are endogenized as follows. Based on some initial guess for the matching probabilities, ordinary
VFI yields a policy function. From this policy function, we calculate aggregate employment
levels by summing hires across the growth path and weighting each generation of hires by
(1−δ)n ; new aggregate employments yield new matching probabilities. Using the old policy
function and new matching probabilities, aggregate employment is recalculated again, and
iteration continues to converged matching probabilities. These converged matching probabilities are then used in level 1 VFI to recalculate the policy function. The new policy
function is now used to calculate a new set of converged matching probabilities (and aggregate employment levels). The process continues until both the policies, and the matching
probabilities (and aggregate employment levels), have converged simultaneously.
These processes are further subsumed under a “level 3” loop, wherein wages are endogenized.
For a set of endogenous value/policy functions and matching probabilities (with aggregate
employment levels), new wages are further calculated using a discrete approximation to the
Nash bargaining equation 3.3.10. Level 2 then repeats, yielding new values, policies, and
matching probabilities. The process continues to convergence in wages.
Finally, wage convergence and all lower-level loops are subsumed under “level 4” iteration,
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which endogenizes the mixing strategy using a bisection method on the support (0, 1). The
upper (lower) bound on the support is iteratively reduced (increased) whenever locating
in region 1 is less (more) attractive than region 2. The level 4 iteration can be computed
across various tax plans and matching frictions, to see how changing regional characteristics
of appeal affects the mixing strategy. It is this type of analysis that enables us to examine
the nature of the talent-tax trade-off in equilibrium.
Global parameters are calibrated as follows. The death rate δ solves (1 − δ)5 = 0.25, in
keeping with the finding of Cooper et al.

(1988) that 25% of businesses exist after five

years. Alternatively, one could calibrate δ by using data on the percentage of television
shows that are cancelled each year, but this is highly variable and also conditional on the
number of seasons of a show to date. The discount rate is the commonly used r = 0.05.
The remaining parameters were chosen to ensure an equilibrium growth path from which
intuition could be gleaned from plots and visualizations.

Table 1: Global Parameters
Parameter

Value

Parameter

Value

r

0.05

φt

0.5

δ

0.242

φl

0.5

µ

20

k

5

σ

10

b

0.1

A

30

χ

0.1

η

1

-

-

The baseline regional parameters (taxes and hiring frictions) are likewise calibrated for visual intuition in this theoretical framework, as follows, in two cases to allow for comparison.

Table 2: Regional Parameters, Two Cases
Parameter

Value

Parameter

Value

τ1

0.1

τ1

0.05

τ2

0

τ2

0

θ1t

0.04

θ1t

0.03

θ2t

0.05

θ2t

0.05

θ1l

0.07

θ1l

0.07

θ2l

0.07

θ2l

0.07

83

Some parameters for region 1 vary between the two cases. In the first case, taxes and
frictions are higher than in the second case. The mechanism by which frictions and taxes
affect the equilibrium mixing strategy works as follows. Suppose equilibrium has been found
at ω ∗ , and suddenly more talented workers are made available in region 1 via a reduction
in the corresponding friction parameter. This raises the matching probability and makes
region 1 more attractive, causing more firms to choose this region. As more firms locate to
region 1, aggregate employment levels rise, reducing the matching probability, until a new
0

equilibrium is reached with some ω ∗ > ω ∗ . Taxes affect the system in a similar way. In
increase in region 1 taxes discourages entry, causing more firms to locate to region 2. This
reduces aggregate employment in region 1, raising the matching probabilities. There will be
0

a new equilibrium ω ∗ < ω ∗ . It is through this mechanism that taxation and the availability
of talent constitute opposing forces in the location decision of firms.
3.4.1. Solution in One Region
Levels 1–3 of the algorithm are solved in the first region, treating the measure of entering
TV firms as exogenous. Matching probabilities for skilled and unskilled workers are found
to be (0.43, 0.59) respectively, despite the relative availability of talent in region 1, reflecting
the greater demand for talented workers.
Both low-tech and high-tech firms exhibit value functions characterized by a steep concavity
in skilled workers. However, technologically undeveloped firms do not benefit as much from
unskilled workers, whereas high-tech firms do, requiring more routinized tasks. For hightech firms, the value function is more steeply concave in unskilled labor, showing greater
returns to that input. A side-by-side comparison between low-tech and high-tech firms is
shown in Figure 19, illustrating firms’ changing labor productivities as a function of total
investment.1 The changing productivities are caused by the dynamic exponents in the
Cobb-Douglas function. Figure 20 illustrates the value function of a mid-tech firm. Once
again, value varies across current labor force compositions. Skilled workers are still more
productive, though unskilled labor is worth more to a high-tech firm than it is to a low-tech
firm. This is observed in the steepening concavity along the unskilled axis.
Figure 21 shows a mid-tech firm’s incremental investment policy for a given labor force
composition. The function is concave and increasing in skilled and unskilled labor, but less
so in unskilled labor, making the shape similar to the value function. The jaggedness of the
policy function arises from insufficient density of the grid, though improving density comes
1

In Figures 19–23, the labor force domains begin at a small positive integer rather than at zero. This is
because when both inputs are close to zero, consumption is negative in firms’ log-utility.
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at a cost of computational burden given the number of variables for which we are solving.
The policy for skilled hires is shown in Figure 22, and appears to be linear and independent
of the number of unskilled hires. Finally, Figure 23 shows the policy for hiring unskilled
labor. This variable does depend on both states of the labor composition. Unskilled labor
hires are increasing in the current size of the skilled labor force, and decreasing in that of
the unskilled labor force. Once again, the kinks in the surface are due to sparsity in the
control space.
3.4.2. Solution in Two Regions
Now the mixing strategy is endogenized using the fourth level of iteration, consisting of a
bisection algorithm on (0, 1) to find the ω for which the difference in values between the
two regions is minimized. The value to locating in a region decreases in the fraction of firms
choosing that region; a higher measure of firms in a region causes the aggregate employment
levels to rise, and this reduces the matching probabilities. Reducing the hiring frictions in
a region increases the value to locating there; a region with lower hiring frictions exhibits
a slower convergence of the matching probability to zero as aggregate employment climbs.
Finally, the value to locating in a region decreases in the local tax rate. Equilibrium strikes
a balance in these various factors of appeal between the two regions.
We compare equilibrium under the two sets of regional parameters given in Table 2, and
find the following results:

Table 3: Equilibria in Two Cases
Parameter

Region 1

Region 2

Parameter

Region 1

Region 2

ω, 1 − ω

0.47

0.53

ω, 1 − ω

0.57

0.43

mt

0.5204

1.0000

mt

0.7256

0.6844

ml

0.6489

1.0000

ml

0.6895

0.7788

wt

0.1255

0.1119

wt

0.1112

0.1231

wl

0.1026

0.1016

wl

0.1017

0.1021

The equilibrium on the right hand side of Table 3 corresponds to a scenario in which
region 1 exhibits lower taxes and hiring frictions for talented workers. As an equilibrium
result, a greater percentage of newborn TV firms choose region 1. Case two shows an
increase in the matching probability of skilled workers in region 1; this is a consequence of
the exogenous decrease in the corresponding frictions. The region 1 matching probability of
unskilled workers increases, most likely due to a fall in demand for unskilled workers; skilled
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workers have become a more viable substitute. Region 2 sees a reduction in both matching
probabilities due to a reduced presence of firms, and hence lower employment levels. The
effects on wages is minimal. In region 1, wages of both types fall; the reverse is true of
region 2.
Figures 24 and 25 show the value to locating in a region as a function of the mixing strategy.
Equilibrium is found at the intersections. The first plot corresponds to the first case, and the
second plot shows how the equilibrium ω increases with a reduction in taxes and frictions
for talented hires; the region 1 line shifts upward. The plots should theoretically exhibit
monotonicity; the results show noisy kinks that would likely disappear with a reduction in
tolerances and an increase in the density of the grids.

3.5. Alternative Formulation
We now consider a more canonical formulation with a non-exponential matching function
and a more robust Nash bargaining condition. This construction will be more analytically
tractable, but induces some numerical complexities; here we present the main analytical
results. For simplicity, only the 1-region case will be considered. As before, there are
two types of labor: skilled and unskilled (or talented and untalented). The primitives of
the model are the same as in the baseline case, save for the matching function and wage
determination, and utility is made to be linear.
Search Frictions
Firms recruit both talented and untalented laborers by posting vacancies vt and vl , to
which workers apply. Vacancy posting costs are φt and φl . To capture search frictions, an
exogenous function M (u, v) governs the matching process, outputting a number of matches
for given inputs u (unemployed) and v (vacancies). We will let M (u, v) exhibit CRS, so we
can focus on functions of the market tightness of a particular labor sector: θ = u/v. We will
thus let m(θ) ≡ M (u, v)/v and p(θ) ≡ m(θ)/θ. The first represents matches per vacancy,
which is relevant for firms posting vacancies. The second is matches per unemployed laborer,
which is relevant to laborers seeking a job; it is their probability of finding one. Thus a firm
that pays φt in order to post a single vacancy for talent receives not 1 but instead m(θt )
talented workers the next period:
t0 = t + m(θt )vt
l0 = l + m(θl )vl
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Firm’s Problem
The firm faces a dynamic optimization problem in which it discounts future value at rate
r and also faces hazard rate δ. It will be easier to analyze the problem recursively. If a
firm currently has running total investment I, talent t, and untalented labor l, it faces the
following problem:

V (I, t, l) = max [R(I, t, l) − wt t − wl l − φt vt − φl vl − ηi2 +
vt ,vl ,i

1−δ
V (I 0 , t0 , l0 )]
1+r

I0 = I + i
t0 = t + m(θt )vt
l0 = l + m(θl )vl

Here we must redefine R(I, t, l) and restrict attention to revenue functions that satisfy
∂R
R
= (1 − αt )
∂t
t
∂R
R
= (1 − αl )
∂l
l
We do not necessarily need revenue to be constant returns to scale in labor (see above,
where revenue is in fact increasing returns to scale). Thus we do not need αt + αl = 1.
However, as we will see in the main theorem of this section, equilibrium in this economy
will only obey clean properties if the marginal product of each labor sector is a constant
fraction of average output attributed to that sector.
Laborer’s Problem
Here we will briefly provide a deeper understanding of the objects E(w, θ) and U (w, θ), the
respective values to laborers of being employed and unemployed. Employed workers receive
wages as long as their employing companies continue to survive (firms face a hazard rate
δ). Unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits b. Laborers discount at the same
rate r as firms. Assume for a moment that wages offered are constant across all firms. We
thus arrive at the following result for laborers.
For each worker type s = {t, l}, the value of being employed is given by the following
recursive equation:
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Es = ws +

1
(δUs + (1 − δ)Es )
1+r

That is, an employed laborer receives a wage today. Then tomorrow the laborer is unemployed with probability δ and employed with probability 1 − δ. Rearranging yields the first
equation above. The value of being unemployed is given by the following recursive equation:

Us = b +

1
(p(θs )(1 − δ)Es + p(θs )δUs + (1 − p(θs ))Us )
1+r

An unemployed laborer receives benefits b. Then tomorrow there are three outcomes. Either
(1) no job offer arrives, (2) a job offer arrives but the firm offering that job succumbs to its
hazard rate, or (3) a job offer arrives and the firm survives until next period. In (1) and
(2) the laborer remains unemployed tomorrow, while in (3) the laborer becomes employed
tomorrow.
Rearranging these two equations, we arrive at:

b(1 + r)(r + δ) + p(θs )(1 − δ)ws (1 + r)
r(r + δ) − p(θs )(1 − δ)(r + 2δ)
ws (1 + r) + δUs
Es =
r+δ
Us =

(3.5.1)
(3.5.2)

With a system of two equations and two unknowns, we have been able to define the value
functions for laborers as a function of the equilibrium wage and market tightness ratio. From
this point forward we will suppress the arguments of each object, and only be interested in
values in equilibrium. We need to pin down equations for the equilibrium wage and market
tightness ratio, and turn to the problem of the firm to accomplish this.
Wage Determination
Firms that post vacancies receive applications from workers, and then hire workers. After
matching occurs, the worker and firm Nash bargain to determine how to split the surplus
that results from the matching. This is contrary to the baseline formulation, wherein
Nash bargaining is conducted only between laborers and nascent firms. Now there is a
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Nash bargaining stage between an individual firm and an individual worker upon every
single hire. This formulation is numerically less tractable, but gives rise to an interesting
analytical result. For s = {t, l}, the Nash bargaining condition is given by:

(1 − χ)[E(ws ) − U (ws )] = χ

dV (I 0 , t0 , l0 )
ds0

(3.5.3)

For simplicity, the continuation probability (1 − δ) is omitted by definition from the RHS.
Here E(w) and U (w) denote the value to a laborer of being employed and unemployed,
respectively, when the wage is w. Since (I, t, l) appears on the RHS of this equation, we
might suspect that the wage paid to a laborer by a firm with resources (I, t, l) should be a
function of I, t, and l, but we will show this not to be the case: Rather, there is a single
wage paid to skilled labors, and a single wage paid to unskilled labor. Intuitively this follows
dV (I 0 , t0 , l0 )
from the fact that under the optimal hiring policy for a firm,
is constant across
ds0
I, t, l in equilibrium, but it will be proven below. Observe that our formulation preserves
the notion of a Hosios condition. Since our matching function is canonical, there remains
the standard definition of matching share of workers, given by

S(θs ) =

us
∂M (us , vs )
θm0 (θ)
=
M (us , vs )
∂us
m(θ)

Thus the standard Hosios condition in each sector is given by

χ = S(θs )

First, observe that since it is highly unlikely for different sectors (with different supplies and
demands for labor) to converge to the same market tightness ratio, unless χ is different in
each sector, then the Hosios condition is unlikely to hold. Second, since firms earn profits
in this economy, the Hosios condition is insufficient for guaranteeing efficiency.
Proceeding in our study of wage determination in this environment, let us begin solving the
firm’s problem. The first order condition for each labor sector is given by
φs
1 − δ ∂V (I 0 , t0 , l0 )
=
m(θs )
1+r
∂s0
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∂V (I, t, l)
∂V (I 0 , t0 , l0 )
.
=
∂s
∂s0
Thus the marginal value of an additional laborer to the firm must be constant in equilibrium.

Since θs is constant in equilibrium, we observe from this FOC that

The intuition is that as firms grow, they hire until the last worker hired has value
φs (1 + r)
m(θs )(1 − δ)

Since this is constant across time, the value of the last laborer hired must be constant across
time.
The envelope theorem result for this economy is given by


1 + r ∂R
∂ws
∂V
=
− ws −
s
∂s
r + δ ∂s
∂s

(3.5.4)

Why the differential terms for the wage? This follows from the fact that firms are individually Nash bargaining with workers. Every time they hire a new worker, the marginal value
of the last worker falls and thus the wage falls. But firms pay the same wage to all of their
employees. Thus the wage falls for their entire stock of labor in a given sector, s.
Recall the revenue function is constructed to satisfy:
∂R
R
= (1 − αs )
∂s
s

Combining this equation with the envelope theorem and the FOC yields the pricing function
pinning down wages as a function of current revenue:

(1 − αs )R = sws +

∂ws 2
sφs r + δ
s +
∂s
m(θs ) 1 − δ

We now turn to the Nash bargaining equation. Combining the Nash bargaining equation
with the envelope result above yields a differential equation in ws :
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ws = χ

(1 − αs )R 1 − χ
∂ws
+
rUs − χ
s
s
1+r
∂s

The solution to this differential equation must take into account the fact that R() is a
function of s, and Us is a function of ws which is a function of s. We have now arrived at
the conditions on Es , Us , ws , θs , which are jointly determined in equilibrium.

3.6. Conclusion
Despite its many comparative advantages in the film and television industry, California has
seen a flight from Hollywood over the past decade as productions have been locating to
other states with more favorable tax incentives. California established the 2009 California
Film and Television Production Tax Credit in response to a series of domestic production
incentives that were introduced in other states in 2005. Still, California remains at a
competitive disadvantage relative to other states, namely its biggest rival, New York, which
has a $420 million annual cap on tax credits and returns close to 30% to productions.
California’s 2009 program offered a tax credit of 20%, or 25% for indie films and relocating
TV series, with an annual cap of $100 million—less than a quarter of New York’s cap.
The result has been an erosion of California’s local entertainment workforce. The Milken
Institute finds that between 2004 and 2012, California’s filmed production employment
levels dropped from 152,525 to 136,388 while New York added 10,675 jobs. The economic
impact of this runaway production is significant, as these are high-paying jobs that support
a variety of other local markets.
Los Angeles has spent over a century developing the world’s largest production infrastructure. The fact that productions are being lured away speaks to the importance of tax
incentives to producers. It also raises questions about how tradeoffs between tax incentives and production infrastructure can influence the locational decisions of productions in
theory. The current paper examines this question in the context of television productions,
which have the characteristic of growing and changing over the course of a life-cycle. The
category of “production infrastructure” is narrowed to encompass labor, specifically the
regional availability of talent.
We have formulated a dynamic search and matching problem with heterogeneous TV firms
and heterogeneous labor supplies and shown how it can help us analyze the regional location
decision faced by television productions. Two models were considered: one with analytical
tractability, and one with numerical tractability. Endogenously dynamic marginal products
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of labor were introduced through a novel Cobb-Douglas revenue function whose exponents
vary with a firm’s total level of investment.
The numerical analysis, subject to a baseline calibration, showcases the following properties.
Increasing matching efficiency increases employment within the region and exerts downward
pressure on employment in the other region. This is contrary to certain calibrations in
Lutgen et al., but the structure of our numerical calibration means the results cannot be
directly compared. In particular, rising employment in one region is not synonymous with
falling unemployment rates, because laborers are not mobile. The remaining numerical
results are consistent with intuition. The value of entering a region monotonically decreases
with the fraction of TV firms entering that region, precisely because a higher measure of
firms makes the region more competitive. As desired, in the case when two regions are
identical, TV firms are indifferent between the two regions when half the firms are in each
region. As a region becomes more attractive (lowering taxes, increasing matching efficiency),
entrants require more firms to be in that region before becoming indifferent.
In the analytically tractable formulation, we show that the results of Felbermayr et al. by
and large hold in a dynamic, ex post heterogeneous setting, which in itself is a success. It
is shown that the results will not hold in a multi-region, mobile-firm setting.
There are a number of promising directions for continued work. (1) Foremost is bringing
the analytically tractable formulation to a numerical setting, for a more natural fit with
the traditional literature. (2) An interesting extension to be considered is to allow for
labor mobility in addition to firm mobility, as we were motivated by creating a theory
that could inform government policy with the purposes of attracting entertainment jobs
and innovation. (3) In the context of the existing model, there is an interesting optimal
policy problem. What is the optimal tax credit that should be offered as a function of
labor availability and relative scarcity of talent? How does optimal policy change allowing
for temporary tax breaks? This second question taps into an interesting component of
the regional selection problem, and remains relatively unstudied in the heterogeneous firm
literature. When trying to attract new businesses or workers, governments are often trying
to change structural parameters of their economy. Businesses and workers may be savvy to
the fact that such changes are potentially temporary, or to the fact that governments face
a time inconsistency problem. In light of these issues, we propose the optimal government
policy problem as a future vein of study.
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Appendix 3.A.
Plots

Figure 16: Decline in hour-long dramas filmed in California; adapted from Klowden et al.
(2014).
State
California
New York
Texas
Florida
Georgia
Tennessee
Louisiana
North Carolina
New Mexico
Nevada

2004
152525
43085
14168
15369
6306
6714
3768
3392
1445
2013

2005
146678
45899
13970
15392
6169
6656
4081
3923
1978
1943

2006
143448
46901
14590
14531
6059
6704
3499
3803
2721
2296

2007
146061
46934
14294
14287
6233
6858
4345
3635
3209
2759

2008
150069
49477
14586
12615
6253
7110
5155
3406
3335
2612

2009
137817
50310
15068
11711
6855
6473
3090
3545
2897
2244

2010
140902
51388
14780
10975
6285
6604
4174
3265
3103
2268

2011
139902
52356
15239
10988
6205
5914
3777
4018
2536
2377

2012
136388
53760
16250
11037
6519
6032
5378
4054
3176
2525

Table 4: Absolute employment numbers in filmed production. Adapted from Klowden et
al. (2014). Sources: Moody’s, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Figure 17: Absolute employment numbers in filmed production, CA and NY.

Figure 18: Technological capability as a function of total investment.
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Figure 19: Comparing value function convexities between low-tech and high-tech TV firms.

Figure 20: Value function of mid-developed TV firm by labor force composition.
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Figure 21: Optimal investment policy of mid-developed firm by labor force composition.
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Figure 22: Optimal skilled hiring policy of mid-developed TV firm by labor force composition.

98

Figure 23: Optimal unskilled hiring of mid-developed TV firm by labor force composition.

Figure 24: Value to locating in each region as function of mixing strategy (case 1).
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Figure 25: Value to locating in each region as function of mixing strategy (case 2).
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